CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 46

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Annex

THE MILITARY THREAT TO HONG KONG UP TO 1960

In this paper we examine the circumstances in which an attack might be made on Hong Kong, its probable scale and nature and the extent to which the attack might be reduced by nuclear counter-action.

2. In addition to the external military threat there is the

We ever present threat of internal sabotage and subversion. have taken into consideration the report of the Local Intelligence Committee, Hong Kong on the Vulnerability of Hong Kong to Non-Military Aggression, dated June 1955, whose conclusions are as follows:

"The Communists have it in their power at any time to create disturbances in the Colon. The degree to which they might do so would, of course, depend on the, circumstances of the time and the object of the operation (e.g. limited pressure for a specific purpose or an all out campaign, verging on civil war, for the complete dislocation and ultimate fall of the Colony). The degree of success that they might achieve and the extent to which they might win over or cow the population would be greatly influenced by the attitude and actions of the Hong Kong Government, the Armed Forces and Her Majesty's Government. In the worst case it would however, be possible for the Communists, should they decide on an all out effort, to disrupt the administration and interfere with the economic life of the Colony to a point where outside assistance would be required."

3.

We believe that, in view of the isolated position of Hong Kong and the large preponderance of Chinese conventional forces available in the area, nuclear weapons must be used by the Allies the very moment the attack begins.

4. We have assumed that, during the period under review, the Chinese will not have developed a nuclear capability of their the under tand own nor will the Russians give them, one.

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THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ATRACK

5. We have appreciated elsewhere that the Communist Chinese are unlikely to embark on a deliberate war by themselves so long as it contains the risk of allied nuclear counter action. They are likely, however, to increase their influence in Hong Kong by subversion and infiltration and to become increasingly capable of causing internal troubles. They might be tempted to think, particularly if faced by a weak garrison, that our professed deterination to defend Hong Kong is only a bluff and that in the end we would not regard it as worth a war with them. It is therefore possible that after a campaign of subversion and infiltration they might, on the pretext of restoring order and protecting their nationals, attempt to overrun the Colony in the hope of a quick victory before reinforcements could arrive and confident that we would not subsequently undertake full scale hostilities against China.

*COS (55)312

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