CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 44

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Copy No..

40

Mr. b. Y barstain

husent para 2 acti

DRAFT

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY, JOINT INTEL IGENCE COMMITTEE

J.I.C. (56)50 (Second Revised Draft)

2nd July, 1956

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JO INT INTELLIGI CE COMMITTEE

THE MILITARY THREAT TO HONG KONG UP TO 1960

Draft Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

frisk dentino

hisert,

of para it

As invited by the Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the circumstances in which an attack might be made on Hong Kong, its probable scale and nature and the extent to which the attack might be reduced by nuclear counter action. Our report is at Annex.

CONCLUSIONS

buanot To so to The American статат

DEŇ

Our conclusions are:-

(a) The Chinese are likely to attack Hong Kong in

the early stages of global war or of a limited war in the Far East in which the United Kingdom is involved. It is also possible that Hong Kong might be attacked in isolation if the Chinese doubted our determination to defend it and thought it could be overrun before the arrival of reinforcements.

(b)

(c)

Immediate attack by the forces in position at the beginning of a war would be on a small scale and we might expect to receive up to 48 hours warning of attack by land forces. These attacks would be combined with sabotage and terrorist campaigns on immediate local initiative.

An attack after full preparation would be better co-ordinated, on an increased scale and accompanied by attempts at large scale acts of sabotage and terrorism.

(126)

•75/9405~ COS (56) 38th Meeting, Minute 5

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Gp. 999 D 1091 WI. 44290 60M 1/56 L{D}Ltd. 1157

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