CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 32

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CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.I.C. (56)50(Final)

4th July, 1956.

U.K. ETES WIď

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE MILITARY THREAT TO HONGKONG UP TO 1960

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

As invited by the Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the circumstances in which an attack might be made on Hong Kong, its probable scale and nature and the extent to which the attack might be reduced by nuclear counter action.

2. With regard to the use of nuclear weapons for the defence of Hong Kong, we are advised that there is no hope that any British nuclear weapons of the particular types required will be available for the defence of Hong Kong by 1960. Therefore, any reduction in the scale of attack by air, sea or land on Hong Kong would depend upon American use of American weapons by the U.S. Navy, and the prior supply of U.S. weapons to British land and air forces in Hong Kong.

3. Our report is at Annex,

4. We have assumed that, during the period under review, the Chinese will not have developed a nuclear capability of their own nor will the Russians give them one. We undramat Repastureng CONCLUSIONS

that this fremiss will be kept under cou

5:

'Yes.

AR VIRY

Our conclusions are:

(a)

The Chinese are likely to attack Hong Kong in the early stages of global war or of a limited war in the Far East in which the United Kingdom is involved. It is also possible that Hong Kong might be attacked in isolation if the Chinese doubted our determination to defend it and thought it could, be overrun before the arrival of reinforcements! with case,

(b) Immediate attack by the forces in position at the

beginning of a war would be on a rolatively small scale and we might expect to receive up to 48 hours warning of attack by land forces. These attacks would be combined with serious sabotage and terrorist campaigns.

cos(56) 38th Meeting, Minute 5

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