CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 104

11.

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The sc formations have been in their present areas, engaged

on road constructional work, for at least 13 months and show no

signs of moving. Poor read communications, lack of railways

and slender road tranposrt resources would discourage the

Chinese from using forces atationed elsewhere on the China coast

or from further inland. The only exception might be in the case

of specialised formations.

12.

It therefore seems likely that the attack would be made by

a minimum of one Army, supported by one Artillery Division, and

a maximum of two Armics supported by one Artillery Division and

possibly some sea Transport units. Assuming units are at 80%

strength, the forces likely to be employed against Hong Kong in

the best and worst cases are approximately as follows :

(a)

Best case:

One army, one artillery division (50,000 all

ranks, 170 guns excluding AA artillery and

(b)

260 medium and heavy mortars. :)

Worst case:

Two armies, one artillery division one sea

transport regiment (100,000 all ranks,

250 guns (excluding AA artillery) and

520 medium and heavy mortars).

We have no means of knowing what tanks might be employed.

13. We do not believe that airborne troops would be used,

except possibly in small numbers for their nuisance value,

owing to the nature of the ground and the fact that there are

no suitable dropping zones.

14.

Surprise attack. The present tactical deployment of the

Chinese forces appear to make it extremely unlikely that they

would expect to achieve success by surprise unless the

possibility of nuclear war has forced a change of view, because

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