CAB9-1_PT2 — Page 232

Page 232

4

This distribution appears to be generally satisfactory. With regard, however, to the moveable armament, the British infantry told off to man the 6-3 pr. Q.F. guns would be more effectual if only armed with their rifles or if manning machine-guns. The use of Q.F. guns of this power is now practically confined at Home and in the Colonies to practice.

The Committee recommend the substitution of 6 machine for the 6-3 pr. Q.F. guns. At present there are only 6 machine-guns included in the moveable armament for the defence of Bombay, and guns of this nature would appear of value to oppose the attacks of landing parties and of marauders on the bridges and the water-mains which it is essential to preserve intact.

It is not very clear why a party of British infantry is specially told off to man 2-40 pr. guns to be taken to Malabar Point on mobilization. Possibly these guns are intended to fire against small craft in Back Bay. If so, they might well be left to be manned when required by men from the heavy gun detachments.

5. With regard to communications referred to briefly in Chapter II, on page 6, it may be assumed that the additional telephone lines contemplated in 1895 have by this time been established. If they are as described on page 13 of the Scheme, they are not very well adapted to the organization of the forts and batteries into two Fire Commands, as in some instances Battery Commanders would only be able to communi- cate with their Fire Commander through other batteries or through the head-quarter office of the Bombay Command. This is not in accordance with the Special Army Order of the 10th December, 1895, which lays down that "the chain of artillery com- mand will invariably run from the Fire Commander through the Battery Commanders to the Gun Group Commanders."

The telephone and telegraph wires are supplemented by a system of visual signalling described on pages 11 and 12. It is not stated whence the signalling parties for the various stations are to be furnished, but they will presumably be taken from the infantry garrisons. It is obvious that the less the strength of these garrisons is weakened by detaching signalling parties from them the better, and, therefore, that those points whence it will be necessary to communicate in war should, as far as possible, be electrically connected beforehand, and worked by the Civil Telegraph Department.

The extension of the Colaba Tramways to Colaba Point and of the Grant Road Tramway to Mahaluxmi (page 16) are also improvements in communications which would be of importance in war, and might therefore be advantageously carried out in peace.

6. The modes of meeting various attacks, which should be described in Chapter II, on page 6, instead of in Chapter I, might be supplemented by a more detailed account of the arrangements by which the troops at any point attacked would be reinforced.

7. It is for consideration of the local authorities whether the arrangement mentioned under the headings of the various departments in Chapter III (pages 8 to 16), by which stores will be issued on demand to the different departments requiring them, is better than that stores should be issued on the order to mobilize without waiting for demands, on the basis of lists always kept by the issuing authorities and periodically revised. As, however, the Scheme provides for these authorities having always in their hands requisitions 'to give them some idea of what the extent of the call on their resources will be," the point is not of great importance.

s

8. The chain of artillery command and the manning details of the forts and batteries should be embodied in the Scheme under the heading "Action to be taken by the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery" (page 8).

The artillery garrison required at Bombay, calculated on the same basis as those that have been approved for Colonial ports, is as follows:---

Page 232

158

Page 232

}