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Page 190 from Georgetown. It is only, therefore, from a small war-ship that a direct attack on Georgetown need be anticipated.

There is, however, another class of vessel which might attempt a raiding attack on Georgetown in the event of a war between Great Britain and the United States of America, That Power is not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris, which forbids privateering, and it seems highly probable that in a struggle with Great Britain letters of marque would be granted to a number of small quick vessels, which in peace are employed on coasting trade, and in war would endeavour to harass British trade and inflict damage on British West Indian Colonies. These vessels would probably carry a light arina- ment sufficient to deal with unarmed merchant-vessels, but in a raiding attack on a town would rely mainly on well-equipped landing parties, which would endeavour to surprise their objective, carry off specie, and inflict as much damage as possible in a very short time. In the case of Georgetown, a landing to the east of the town would probably be considered to offer the greatest chance of success, but a landing might possibly also be attempted from a vessel that had run past the entrance to the river on a dark night and anchored to the south.

4. It is possible that an attack somewhat similar in nature to that described above might be directed against New Amsterdam, on the River Berbier, the second town of the Colony. As there are police and militia forces at this place, it would be well to extend the Scheme so as to include its defence.

Ultimately, should Bartica, at the junction of the Cuyuni, Mazaruni, and Essequibo Rivers, acquire the importance which its position appears to promise, it may be necessary to consider also the defence of that place. There is not, however, at present anything to tempt a hostile enterprise up the Essequibo River.

5. If the strategic conditions detailed above are accepted and embodied at the commencement of the Defence Scheme, they should be followed by its present para- graph 1 and by a similar description of New Amsterdam. Paragraph 2 will no longer be required. Paragraph 3, modified as may be necessary in accordance with para- graph 10 of these Remarks, would more suitably come under Chapter II (D).

6. Page 5, paragraph 1, last Sub-paragraph.--Though there is no objection to getting information as to approaching vessels from the light-house and light-ships as here proposed, it must be borne in mind that their neutrality should not be compro- mised by the presence of soldiers.

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CHAPTER II.

7. Page 9 (A). The division of the defence of Georgetown into two Sections, as proposed in the Scheme, is not necessary. It appears, indeed, to be only a nominal division, as all the troops except the artillery and some infantry outposts are to be kept concentrated in a central position till a landing is threatened or attempted (page 21), and provision is made for the employment of all the troops in either one of the Sections should the attack be concentrated thereon, and should there be no likeli- hood of its being developed elsewhere (page 10 (D). This is practically treating the whole of the defence as one Section, and is the right arrangement. It is not necessary, therefore, to tell off permanent Commanders to detachments that may be sent out to resist an advance from any particular direction. Unless it appears to be a feint the bulk of the defensive force will oppose it under the command of the Commandant or the Senior Officer present.

8. Page 9 (B).—The re-establishment of the Infantry Militia appears from the Returns of Resources on the 31st December, 1897, to add some 200 men to the garrison of Georgetown, bringing up the total available for infantry defence to about 650, and, including the artillery, to 700. This number, if actually available when required, will amply meet the requirements of the strategic conditions explained above.

It would be convenient to record, under the heading "Distribution of Troops and Armament," that although the actual strength of the Police Force is about 850, the detachments at out-stations must remain for the maintenance of order in the interior and on the land frontier, and cannot, therefore, be reckoned as available for the defence of Georgetown.

For the reasons given in paragraph 7 of these Remarks, the troops should not in future be shown distributed by Sections. It is also not necessary to tell them off into firing linc, supports and reserves as such distribution would be made at the time of an impending attack according to the actual conditions then obtaining.

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