CAB9-1_PT2 — Page 166

Page 166

4

Department List, dated Simla, 1st April, 1897, has now been provided, the require- ments of Aden are about 36 officers and $36 W.O.s, N.C.O.s, and men, as shown in the Appendix to these Remarks. The numbers allotted to staff and command in this Table are approximate only, as they depend on the approved chain of artillery command for the fortress, which is not available to the Committee. The Table includes no detachments for machine guns; where these form part of movable arma- ments, they are now recognized as infantry weapons; those at Aden told off for flank defence of ditches, could be worked by detachments from the heavy guns which would not be in action at the moment of an assault on the forts.

To meet the requirements of 29 officers and 836 of other ranks, there are, according to the Scheme (page 23), 19 officers, 423 W.O.s, N.C.O.s and men, R.A., and 100 native Lascars available, and these are to be reinforced on or before the outbreak of hostilities by 2 officers and 66 N.C.O.s and rank and file, R.A. (page 73); the Committee are informed that a further addition of 43 specialists was made to the artillery garrison of Aden in 1896, bringing up the total in war to 21 officers and 532 of other ranks. There still remains a serious deficiency to be made up, according to the Scheme, by employing infantry on artillery duties. Similar deficiencies were noted when, in 1897, the garrisons of British fortresses and coaling stations abroad were reconsidered. It was then decided by the War Office that, having in view the greater liability of these places to attack by troops landed from hostile ships, than to bombardment, the comparatively small infantry forces which could be made available there, should not be disseminated and employed in working guns, but that the provision of gunners should be increased, and the calls. on them lessened, where possible, by the substitution of medium Q.-F. guns, such as the 6-inch and 47-inch for old type R.M.L. and R.B.L. Ordnance, which were less effective, besides requiring more than double the personnel to work them. It is suggested that the Government of India should consider the advisability of taking similar action with regard to Aden, and also that the movable armament approved for that place, according to the 1897 list, would well bear reduction. This movable armament would not be very effective for firing on the decks of modern ships, as suggested on page 6 (e) of the Scheme. It is not clear for what purpose 13-3-pr. Q.-F. guns are included; the use of these guns is now practically confined at Home and in the Colonies to practice, and they would be of little value against torpedo-boat attack.

10. If arrangements can be made for working the guns entirely by artillery the British and native battalions should suffice to meet any probable attack from troops landed from hostile ships. The four war-ships mentioned in Chapter I, Part III of the Scheme could furnish, perhaps, 600 men, but assuming a landing force of three times that strength a garrison of two battalions, if properly handled should, in a place so favourable for defence as Aden, easily be able to deal with it, even without the additional battalion which it appears to be contemplated (page 73) to send from India when hostilities are imminent. Not more than two battalions are provided at any Imperial fortress or coaling station abroad, except Malta, Gibraltar, and the Cape, nor is it proposed to reinforce these places when war is anticipated, it being recognized that the safe transport of troops at such a time could not be guaranteed. The trans- port of troops from Bombay to Aden would certainly not then be attended with the same risks as their transport from England to a Colony, but at the same time it would be of advantage if Aden were independent at the outbreak of war of assistance from outside.

11. Apart from the question of withdrawing infantry from artillery duties, it appears to be for consideration whether an unnecessary dissemination of the infantry force does not result from the present organization into Sections and Sub-Sections.

It is not quite clear from the Scheme whether it is intended to permanently man such Sub-Sections as Telegraph Bay or not (compare page 50, middle, with page 3, bottom), but in any case the command of the mobile troops in the vicinity of the harbour is essentially one and indivisible. A single officer, to be called, say, the Officer Commanding Harbour Field Force, should be responsible for preventing a landing near and advance on any of the Steamer Point Batteries. For this purpose he should have the whole of the infantry and movable armament allotted to the position at his disposal. He would naturally keep the bulk of this force concentrated, cover all vulnerable points by a system of outposts, and utilize the prepared positions as "points d'appui" during an attack. Meanwhile the Fire Commander or Fire

1

{

*

7

10 Page 166 of 290

Page 166