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are impracticable, Commodore Wilson arrived at the following general con- elusions:

"1. That war-ships could only be dispatched from enemies' ports within a limited distance, say 2,000 miles.

2. That armed merchant-ships can practically come from any distance.' "Sir W. Jervois, in considering the same question, expressed his opinion that whilst the bulk of the enemy's naval forces would be occupied in the immediate scene of action in Europe or America, he might no doubt dispatch one or more cruizers to operate against our maritime commerce or make a descent upon one of the Australasian ports.

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"The permanent addition of seven ships of war to the Australasian squadron for service in those waters only will materially change the whole aspect of the question of defence. If, before the possibility of this powerful addition of naval strength had arisen, the hostile force which could reasonably be expected to be employed against Australasian ports as long as our Navy held the seas was limited to a few cruizers or armed merchant-steamers who might chance to temporarily evade Her Majesty's ships, then, à fortiori, the probabilities of an attack even of this nature may now be heavily discounted.

"As regards present conditions, it may be remarked that the present policy of France has taken the direction of a reduction of naval force in Australasian waters.

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"Under these circumstances, the Colonial Defence Committee consider that Major-General Schaw has somewhat overrated the possibilities of hostile action which present themselves to an enemy. They are fully aware that it is possible for cruizers to evade for the moment even the large naval force which will in less than two years be available in Australasian waters, and they entirely concur, therefore, with the opinion that the harbours of New South Wales 'must be prepared to resist at short notice a naval attack delivered by one or two cruizers.' On the other hand, they consider that, under any circumstances short of some disaster having occurred to the British Navy, there is no reasonable probability whatever of these ports being called upon to resist attack by a fleet including some powerful iron-clads, and capable of landing some 2,000 or 3,000 men.' France has at present only one iron-clad abroad, and this on the China Station, where a British iron-clad of superior power is always retained. Russia now has one armoured cruizer, and may shortly have two, on the China Station, but in the absence of an assured coal supply they could scarcely be employed at a distance of 6,000 miles from Vladivostock. Any 'powerful iron-clads' intended to operate in Australasian waters must come from Europe under the greatest difficulties as to coal supply, and it is most improbable that any European Power would dispatch such vessels so far from home waters. It should be remembered that, to provide a landing party of 3,000 men, ten cruizers would be required carrying as many troops as could conveniently be accommodated on board, and prepared, in addition, to place on shore every man from their own crews who could possibly be spared. operation thus assumes the magnitude of an expedition, while it is incon- ceivable that a Naval Commander would risk such a force on shore unless he was absolutely_guaranteed against all naval interference during a considerable period. Finally, it cannot be admitted that either New Caledonia or the New Hebrides' (the temporary French occupation of which has now ended) offer sufficient facilities for refitting and making preparations for invasion." There is no French port nearer than Toulon which would serve for such a purpose."

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It was these considerations which weighed with the Colonial Defence Committee in drawing up their Memorandum of the 1st March, 1888, forwarded to the Governor on the 15th March, 1888, in which they deprecated the construction of the proposed island fort on the Pope's Eye Shoal.

The very large armament which has already been provided for the defence of Port Phillip and Melbourne will amply suffice for the defence of a port whose geographical position in relation to the bases of all other Powers renders attack so exceptionally difficult.

So long as the existing defences are as ready for action as this carefully- drawn scheme indicates, no further additions appear to be at present justified, in the real interests of the Colony.

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