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distant, would be able to draw upon a considerable body of troops provided that no difficulties arose in Tonquin; but so long as the British squadron in the China Seas is maintained, as at present, at a strength greatly superior to that of the French, the Colonial Defence Committee consider that the transport of troops for the attack on Singapore would be hardly feasible,

Any increase to the French or Russian naval strength in the China seas should at once be met by a corresponding increase of Her Majesty's ships in eastern waters.

As regards an attack by landing parties from ships' crews the maximum estimate of the Commandant-1,000 men from "three or four ships "-appears to be excessive. During the French operations at Tamsui only 540 men were landed from three iron-clads and two barbette cruizers, although there was no Chinese naval force to cause any apprehension. The recent Russian instructions for landing parties, translated in the Intelligence Division of the War Office, state, "The largest ships might thus supply one or one and a-half companies," i.e., at most 144 men, and an average landing party of 150 men per ship is, under the circumstances, an ample allowance.

It appears to the Colonial Defence Committee, therefore, that the available landing parties of a small squadron, which must be in constant expectation of having to oppose Her Majesty's ships, would not be a formidable body in point of numbers.

There remains the question of an expeditionary force embarked from Europe. As the Committee have pointed out in their Memorandum No. 19 of the 1st November, 1886, addressed to all Colonies, "An expedition of this class could hardly be prepared without exciting notice, and it would be the special object of Her Majesty's navy to frustrate such attempts." The starting of such a force should be known, and every effort would be made to intercept it. Thus, even if the difficulties of coal supply could be overcome, the prospect of success would not be great, while it must be remembered that the reinforce- ment of Singapore from England would be at least as easily carried out, and from India would be more easy and far more expeditious.

The above considerations weighed with the Colonial Defence Committee in recommending the garrison laid down in their Memorandum No. 31 of the 6th December, 1887, and if the numbers there proposed-2,079 of all ranks exclusive of volunteers are duly provided, they consider that Singapore has little to fear from land attack.

The scheme of defence, which has been very carefully drawn up by the Local Committee, serves to bring out the great weakness of the personnel. This scheme is based upon the existing strength of the garrison, which is given as follows:-

1 battalion infantry

2 batteries Royal Artillery

Gun Lascars

1 battery Volunteer Artillery

Total

+

•

720

180

15

80

995

Arrangements have, however, been made for the immediate transfer, in the event of war, of 350* Sikhs from Perak to Singapore, thus bringing up the available total strength to 1,345, exclusive of infantry volunteers. Thus, the conditions of defence are somewhat more favourable than is assumed by the Local Committee; but, on the other hand, a great deficiency of artillerymen will be felt as soon as the whole of the armament has been provided.

The scheme of defence generally stated comprises the occupation of—

1. Alexandra Position.

2. Blakan-Mati (including Passir Panjang) and Pulo

Brani Island.

3. Tanjong Katong.

With reserves at Mount Faber and Fort Canning. These reserves, with the present strength of garrison, are inevitably insignificant, and even including

* To be subsequently increased to 500.

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