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complete. Under these circumstances the Committee consider that the requirements of the submarine mining service are sufficiently provided for.

On the other hand, they consider that the want of an adequate force of fortress engineers would be severely felt in the event of war, and they recommend the strength proposed by Sir L. Simmons, viz., 300 men.

4. The want of quick-firing guns to which the Governor alludes is a serious defect in the existing defences, but one which will be very shortly removed.

5. As regards guard-boats, the Committee are of opinion that any small local vessels would answer the purpose, which is mainly one of night-patrol, since all the mines lie within short range of a heavy armament, and electric lights and quick-firing guns are being provided, so that, as pointed out by His Royal Highness the Admiral Commanding on the Station, guard-boats are not greatly needed. They desire to emphasize the desirability of employing local vessels to patrol out to sea by night and to guard against surprise in the early morning.

6. The distribution of troops proposed by the Governor serves to bring out clearly the grave deficiency of available garrison. After providing a minimum garrison for Valetta and the coast defences, there remain only two battalions to hold the long line from Madalena Bay to Fomm-el-Rih. This force is manifestly inadequate, and in view of the probable strength of attack, the Colonial Defence Committee consider that the infantry garrison of Malta should be raised to 9,000, inclusive of the native militia battalion - which they strongly recommend should be raised at once. If a useful auxiliary force can thus be obtained, the cost of the necessary infantry garrison and of the increased barrack accommodation would be correspond- ingly reduced.

The Committee desire to point out that the battalion which is at present maintained in Cyprus on political grounds, and the withdrawal of which they have already recommended, might be included in the garrison of Malta, arrangements being made for its immediate transport to the latter station so soon as its removal from the former station becomes practicable.

The existing deficiency of artillery also requires immediate remedy. The accompanying Table shows that the force necessary to provide one relief only for the service of the approved armament of Malta, exclusive of quick- firing and flanking guns, amounts to 2,606 men. On the assumption above laid down as to the probable force of attack on Malta, it is evident that a large portion of the armament might be simultaneously employed, and that a transference of artillerymen from one work to another cannot be counted upon. Even allowing for the assistance of the infantry garrisons of the works in some cases, the Colonial Defence Committee consider that the artillery force consistent with safety cannot be estimated at less than 2,500 men, including the Fencibles, and this is the number stated to be necessary for the war garrison by Sir L. Simmons in his evidence before Mr. Stanhope's Consultative Committee. This force should, in their opinion, be provided.

7. Sir L. Simmons again draws attention to the absence of a reserve of food, and suggests that a three years' supply of wheat for the garrison should be maintained, equivalent to a two months' supply for the whole population, or with existing provisions, to a four months' supply. The subject of the food supply of Malta was dealt with by a Special Committee in 1877, by which the military aspects of the question do not appear to have been fully grasped. In their Memorandum No. 14 of the 5th August, 1885, the Colonial Defence Committee strongly urged that a reserve of grain should be maintained; but they are informed that the Colonial Office has as yet given no effect to their recommendations, since it has been ascertained that the Council would not vote the required sum on the grounds that the matter is one which mainly concerns the Imperial Government. Even the unbroken main- tenance of the command of the Mediterranean during war would not assure the revictualling of Malta except by escorted convoys, since the operations of fast cruizers in these narrow seas could not be wholly restrained; and the action of Her Majesty's navy ought not to be hampered and enfeebled by the necessity of making provision for the escort of food supplies. On all grounds, therefore, it appears urgently necessary that the reserve proposed by the Governor should be at once created. The

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