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9. Chapter IV.-The division of the possible operations of an enemy under heads and sub-heads has the effect of increasing the details of the Scheme, and produces a tendency for the sake of symmetry to suppose forms of attack on certain places which are so improbable as to be better not suggested. For instance, bearing in mind the Imperial naval force on the station, the nature of the place to be attacked, and the existing defences, it is almost inconceivable that an enemy such as is contemplated would resort to the following form of attack:-

Port Jackson.-A (2). Attempt to run past forts and mine-fields at speed, and thus gain access to the harbour.

B (1). Attack by torpedo-boats by day with the object of destroying ships, &c., in the harbour.

Newcastle.-A (2). Same.

B (1). Same.

Botany Bay.-A (2). Same.

The form of attack A (2), without first silencing the forts and destroying the mine-fields, may be placed beyond the sphere of practical belligerency, and at Botany Bay such a form of attack would, moreover, be useless, as the guns on Bare Island command all the water inside the entrance beyond the 3-fathom line.

As regards the form of attack B (1), thick weather is the only condition under which torpedo-boats, especially of second class, would venture to attack a defended port by day, and the very condition would so deprive them of any prospect of inflicting damage when inside the harbour, that there is little likelihood of such an attempt being ever undertaken.

While it may be well to indicate generally how attacks of the above nature may best be met, it is well also not to push the detailed consideration of them beyond what the fair probabilities of the case justify. Not only must there be a sufficient reason for an enemy to run the risk of engaging his ships within interior waters, or for his landing men, even in small parties, but he must be assured that he will have a certain time free from molestation by our ships; otherwise it would be foolhardy in the extreme on his part to place himself at such a disadvantage.

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10. The tendency to push the fair probabilities to too great an extreme leads to providing against "a land attack on a large scale" at Botany Bay (p. 27), a deliberate attack on Wollongong-Bulli," with attempt to seize certain of the jetties and coal mines for the purposes of coaling in full (p. 30), and an attack from Port Stephens "under certain eventualities," which, it is allowed, to have any chance of success, would have to number 15,000 to 20,000 men with transport (p. 42).

As regards the attack on Wollongong-Bulli, it is admitted (p. 31) that a considerable force would be required to seize the jetties and coal mines, and the "one or two second class cruisers" (p. 30), besides landing this force, would have to coal in full.

The proposal to meet any attack here at the outset by the destruction on the part of the defence of the jetties and mining plant is much to be depre- cated. It would in all probability cause a greater eventual loss to the Colony than letting the cruisers fill up with coal, even supposing that they could do so. Moreover, it is wholly unnecessary. Before the "one or two second class cruisers" could venture to either come alongside to coal, or to use their boats to coal while they lay off the port, they would have to be in undisputed possession of the port, and this, in the face of even a small force of rifles on shore, it would be difficult to secure or to retain. Even then they would have to provide a covering party, which they could ill spare at a time when all hands would be required to complete the operation of coaling as rapidly as possible.

It is also to be remembered that any attempt in the nature of a raid on a port implies more or less fugitive action on the part of a cruiser, and the prospect of some of our ships appearing at any moment would tend to deter her from entering the port, or from depleting her crew by sending detach-

ments on shore.

For the operation to be attempted by a larger force of ships is to pre- suppose that our squadron has failed in the duties for which it is maintained. Moreover, in this case the operation of coaling would demand a longer

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