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This principle is specially applicable to the case of Mauritius.

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It was pointed out at the Conference on Reinforcements, in January 1890, how important it is that at the outbreak of war with a Maritime Power the Navy should be absolutely free from all duties of convoy during such time as may reasonably be supposed to be necessary in order to clear the seas. That it is just during this early period of the war that the movements of transports will be most exposed to risk. That if our naval operations are successful, and result in the enemy's ships being driven off the seas, it may be hoped that a time will come in the course of the war when ships conveying reinforcements might, like ordinary merchant-ships, safely move from fortified point to fortified point under cover of the patrols protecting the waters between those points, but that what length of time might elapse before this stage will be reached it is impossible to predict. That the more self-contained the naval fortresses and coaling-stations are, the more useful and valuable will they be to the Navy, whereas it will prove a drag to the Navy, and cripple in a measure its legitimate action, if it is forced to detach ships to insure the safe arrival at these stations of reinforcements required to complete their garrisons at the outbreak of war.

It was specially pointed out with regard to Mauritius that an attack by the French is just as likely to be made immediately on the outbreak of war as at any other period. That the French could embark from Diego Suarez some 600 men (out of 1,000 Europeans and 300 natives stationed there), while 200 more might be brought from Réunion. That Diego Suarez, where the troops are concentrated, is distant 700 miles and Réunion under 100 miles from Mauritius, while Durban, the port of Natal, which is the nearest point from which to reinforce Mauritius, is nearly 1,900 miles distant, and the Cape, whence under the authorized scheme the reinforcements are to be supplied, is nearly 2,800 miles distant. The French are therefore three to four times nearer than the reinforcements.

Thus it is undeniably expedient that the garrison of Mauritius should be maintained at its approved strength, and if this can only be arranged for by reducing some other garrison, it is submitted that it would be preferable to keep a whole infantry battalion at Mauritius and only a-half battalion in Natal, instead of a-half battalion at Mauritius and a whole battalion in Natal, which is the present arrangement. From an Imperial Defence point of view, Natal is of immeasurably less importance than Mauritius, and judging from late events, the South African settlers are capable of safeguarding their own interests with but little aid from British troops. Moreover, on emergency, Natal could be much more easily and rapidly reinforced from the Cape than could Mauritius.

W. PEACOCKE, Secretary,

Colonial Defence Committee.

(Signed)

January 19, 1894.

Extract from Remarks by Colonial Defence Committee on Mcuritius Scheme of

Defence, dated November 15, 1893.

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*

#

Garrison. The Committee concur in the views expressed at p. 21 as to the most probable form of attack, and at p. 29 as to the numerical insufficiency of the present garrison to meet it.

In their Memorandum No. 31 of December 1887, and again in their Remarks of April 1888, the Colonial Defence Committee pointed out that the special position of Mauritius, in close proximity to Réunion and the French. establishment in Madagascar, rendered it peculiarly liable to French attack. In the event of the Suez Canal being closed, Mauritius would at once become a most important coaling station on the alternative route to India and China. This consideration alone would fully justify a determined attempt to capture the island at the outbreak of war, especially since a brief occupation would suffice for the destruction of the defences and coal stores. They recommended a garrison of→

Regulars

Volunteers or Militia..

1,484

550

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