CAB9-1_PT1 — Page 184

Page 184

JE

Ε

[1

ti

2

The relative disadvantage of ships compared with shore batteries as regards accuracy of fire would, not improbably, be increased by their inability to anchor owing to the extreme depth of water outside the 2,000 yards' range.

It may be observed with regard to the remark on p. 6 (14th line from bottom), that this is probably the first occasion on which it has been formally admitted that a British fortress garrisoned by thousands of British troops, even though its sea defences may have been impaired by attack, is in the smallest degree likely to be threatened with bombardment if it does not comply with a demand for contributions. Such a demand on even a fortified port of the lowest rank is a novelty in war. The remark is unnecessary, and might be omitted.

3. Page 7 (▲). This paragraph assumes that the enemy, when war with the greatest naval Power in the world is imminent, will abandon the concentration, which he has spent years in effecting, in order to send certain of his armoured ships to a place hundreds of miles distant from his base, on the chance that a treacherous attack on a strongly garrisoned British fortress may succeed.

The Committee consider that the sudden irruption of a hostile armour- clad into such a harbour as either of those of Valetta is so improbable and so little within the range of practical belligerency that the possibility of an attack of this nature may be entirely disregarded.

4. Page 7 (B). As regards a raid by a swarm of torpedo-boats, it is to be remembered that any origin whence such an attack could come is very remote. The nearest probable hostile port is Sfax, 200 miles distant, entailing a run there and back of 400 miles. The greatest run of a 1st class torpedo-boat on record is 420 miles, and the conditions of that case were quite exceptional, so fhat Malta can only barely be considered to be within ordinary torpedo-boat radius of action of Sfax. To carry out such a raid with 1st class torpedo- boats, it would practically be necessary to concert measures for the boats to rendezvous within easy striking distance of Malta to fill up their coal from some depôt ship at sea, which means delay, with increased chance of being caught by bad weather, and of discovery where surprise is the essence of the attack. The operation, however, cannot be pronounced actually impossible, though attack by small torpedo-boats ("torpilleurs embarqués "), such as might be carried on board a ship like our Vulcan," or by some such vessel as a torpedo gun-boat, is much more probable, and reasonable precautions must therefore be taken against it. The measures to be taken to provide for the safety of ships in harbour and dock caissons from this class of attack, such as the booms, search-lights, and new quick-firing gun emplacements referred to at p. 9, and the cognate questions of Harbour Regulations, Submarine Mine Defence, and the selection of examination anchorages, should be considered in the sense of the guiding principles approved by the Joint Naval and Military Committee, which have been circulated lately to all General Officers Commanding. As mentioned in that Circular, any booms required will be made and worked by the navy.

66

5. Page 8 (bottom). The Committee have been given to understand that the four 2nd class torpedo-boats posted to Malta for defence purposes have been withdrawn. The Admiralty have consistently represented of late years that it is contrary to their policy to tie down any portion of the fleet, torpedo- boats included, to the local defence of any place, and it may be taken as certain that any torpedo-boats that may be stationed at Malta will be for offensive-not defensive-purposes. These boats cannot be used with much prospect of good effect by day in the defence of a port, and a night attack by heavy war-ships is improbable under any conditions.

6. Pages 8, 14. The Committee consider that the garrison of Malta is still numerically weak, being 2,097 below the authorized war establishment, and they fully concur in the recommendation that it should be strengthened by quartering in the island some part of the intended reinforcements now detained in England and Cyprus. To insure the safe arrival of reinforcements at the outbreak of war would be exceptionally difficult in the case of Malta without the aid of a protecting squadron, and no part of our fleet, according to the express statement of the Admiralty, can be counted on to be available for such a service. If the additional troops from England cannot be arranged for, the Committee venture to urge on Her Majesty's Government that, at least, the Cyprus Garrison should be drawn in at once to Malta. From a military point

Page 184

Page 184