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is nothing to criticize in Colonel Fox's very clear statement, which shows a thoroughly correct appreciation of the conditions of the case.

4. The proposal to disband corps in unimportant and remote places, utilizing the money saved by their reduction to improve those corps which remain, seems to be amply justified. Raiding attacks on the chief commercial or coal ports, undertaken most probably at the outset of a war, and as a surprise, are the chief dangers to be guarded against, a class of attack which calls for the power of mobilizing the defences of any threatened port at very short notice. There- fore, to maintain any corps that is beyond a limited number of hours' distance from the main points of concentration is a wholly unjustifiable policy. With the establishment of internal peace and order the reasons which may have led originally to the formation of many of these corps have ceased to exist, and their retention is not only obviously a waste of defence money, but is positively harmful, by giving the public a delusive impression of the strength of the force really available to repel external attack, and by absorbing the time of the instructional and inspectional staff, to the detriment of the corps that really are of use. The Committee strongly recommend that effect should be given to Colonel Fox's proposals on this point with the least possible delay.

5. The expediency of retaining the Naval Artillery Volunteers as such is not quite apparent from the Report, though there may be some unexplained reason for not interfering with them. They are not required for naval purposes, and it is the evident intention to use them, with the exception of the submarine miners, purely as garrison artillery in the coast batteries. It would seem, primá facie, that it would simplify organization to retain the submarine miners as such, and amalgamate the gunners with the garrison artillery.

6. It is open to question if it is a wise arrangement to have part of the available garrison artillery -the most important branch under the most probable form of attack-employed as police, unless local circumstances lead to the belief that, when required, they could be spared for continuous military duty.

7. As regards the adequacy of the numbers contemplated in Colonel Fox's scheme, it is difficult for the Colonial Defence Committee to express any decided opinion in the absence of any defence scheme. There must be a sufficient force of artillery and submarine miners to serve the batteries and minc-fields, to which must be added a proper force of infantry to insure the safety of the batteries against any small storming parties landed in their vicinity. There must be, in addition to the above, and separate from it, a field force of reliable mobility to oppose an enemy attempting to land in somewhat greater strength. The exact numbers necessary to meet these requirements can only be determined by intimate local knowledge. Judging, however, from previous estimates, the strength proposed in the Report should suffice to give the Colony reasonable security.

The total force recommended by General Schaw in 1887 was :-

Permanent Volunteers

Total

་་

332 3,982

4,314

Again, in 1889 Major-General Edwards, C.B., proposed a total force as follows:

Artillery and submarine miners

Infantry (4 regiments)

Mounted infantry (4 corps)

Field artillery (4 batteries)

Engineers (4 companies) Staff and Departments

Total

670

2,400

720

360

120

220

4,490

to be distributed at the four centres of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.

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