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Extract from Remarks by Colonial Defence Committee on the Report of the Council of Defence, Victoria, for the year 1892.

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In reply to the two questions asked by the Minister of Defence in his Report of the 6th October, 1892, the Committee consider that it is useless and practically impossible to attempt to treat the defence of the Australian Colonies otherwise than as a whole, or to lay down any estimate of their individual requirements for a mere passive policy such as is indicated in the first question of the Minister.

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The reasons that influenced the Committee in acquiescing in General Edwards' estimate of the strength of the force requisite are clearly stated at p. 3 of their Memorandum of the 16th May, 1890, and the paragraph beginning "Finally'

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strategic advantage of the first importance" seems to call for little further explanation. From the Memorandum, it should be clear that they find it impossible to regard any measure of defence as satisfactory which does not contemplate the contingency of offence. The teaching of history shows that mere passive defence is costly and in the long run wholly ineffective in obtaining lasting results, and nothing could be more short-sighted than to estimate the forces of the Australian Colonies on the basis of such a pusillanimous and unenterprising policy. To wage successful war it is necessary not merely to repel attack, but to so end that war that solid guarantees for the future are taken. For example, if we were at war with France it would be cheaper in the long run and better policy to finish off Noumea once for all than to have a perpetual thorn in the side of Australia, which would menace out of all proportion to its real power of inflicting injury. Under the circumstances, it would be the cheapest and best policy to end for ever the irritation and power of inflicting loss arising from the French possession of New Caledonia by sweeping that nation altogether out of Australian waters. It is out of the question, nor would it, it is believed, be acceptable to the Australian Colonies, to employ Imperial troops in this part of the world, and any force to act outside Australia in these regions must be furnished by the Colonies themselves. It is on such larger basis that the strength of the forces to be maintained should be estimated, and it thus becomes useless to consider the smaller question of their individual needs in this respect for mere passive defence.

Again, it is impossible to separate the military interests of the different Australian Colonies. If, for example (and supposing for a moment such to be possible), a determined attempt were to be made by a hostile power to occupy and hold either Thursday Island, King George's Sound, or Tasmania, it is evident that the interests of all the Australian Colonies would be involved.

Such considerations dictate the maintenance by each Australian Colony of a force sufficient to supply its proper quota of a contingent to act not only outside the borders of its own particular Colony, but also, if requisite, outside the Continent itself.

These views will, it is believed, commend themselves to the Victorian Government. The Colony of Victoria has always occupied a prominent position in regard to questions of defence, which it has interpreted in a broad and liberal-minded sense. To abandon this policy would involve a break with all proceedings of the past, and a fresh and deplorable departure, which would be injuriously felt throughout Australia.

As regards the nature of the menace of Noumea, the Committee adhere to their opinion expressed at p. 2 of their Memorandum of the 16th May, 1890, and quoted by the Defence Minister, viz., that "Noumea does not possess the qualifications of a base," and that "defence, not aggression, would be its probable aim."

It may have a garrison of 3,000 regular troops, but the majority of these are tied to the island by the custody of the 9,000 to 10,000 convicts. Convict battalions could not be dispatched on an expedition, as it would be unsafe for their gaolers to arm them. Nor, again, even though Noumea is a terminus of the Messageries steamers, could the requisite shipping for an expedition be collected there unnoticed, nor does it possess facilities for equipping an expedition on a scale of magnitude. But in one respect Noumea

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