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with the United Kingdom. Enormous, however, as is the value of this trade, it by no means represents that which, in the event of war, with one or more of the great Naval Powers, might pass round the Cape." They estimated the then total value of trade thus increased at 150,000,000%., exclusive of that of the shipping in which it would be carried, and they added: "The Cape route is not only of importance in connection with the commerce of Great Britain, but assumes a far higher degree of importance to the Empire at large, as being essential to the retention by Great Britain of her possessions in India, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, China, and even Australia. It is by this route alone that reinforcements of troops and all that is necessary for their support could, under the contingencies alluded to, be sent from the United King- dom with any degree of certainty or security."

The Canadian Pacific Railway, completed since the Commission reported, has provided a valuable alternative route to the East; but one which can only in a minor degree take the place of that passing round the Cape. Thus, in the not improbable event of the Suez Canal being closed in time of war, the Cape would become at once the most important coaling station of the Empire. The Scheme of Defence furnished by the War Office, and accepted by the Royal Commission, stated: "Russia and France are the only European Powers respecting which, for the present at least, we need entertain apprehension. France, it is true, has a military establishment at Senegambia; but it may be held of little account, as at the outbreak of war it should be seized or destroyed by the British fleet."

Since the above was written, the strength of the French position in Senegambia has been materially increased. The general question of an attack upon the Cape Peninsula has, however, been little affected thereby, although the security of the trade route between Cape Town and the United Kingdom is now more seriously threatened.

The Royal Commission remarked "that any attack would be of a very sudden nature, and probably would be made at the first outbreak of war, when there will have been little or no warning of danger or time for prepara- tion, and before Imperial troops could be dispatched to reinforce the garrison and place the peninsula in a state of security. The power, also, that a force attacking from the sea has of making feints and of being transferred from one point to another with great rapidity, and without warning, renders it essential that the important positions of Cape Town and Simon's Bay, which are so distant from each other that they must, to a certain extent, be self-dependent, should be secured against attack at all times.”

Assuming the full co-operation of the Colony against attempted aggres- sion, it is clear that the Cape could be effectively attacked only by a considerable squadron accompanied by a land force of not less than 10,000 men. It is practically impossible that such a force could be collected at any of the French colonial ports-(the nearest French Colonies, Réunion and Senegambia, are distant 2,600 and 4,500 miles respectively, and neither offer sufficient facilities for making preparations for such an expe- dition) or be dispatched direct from France, without our knowledge, and it could therefore be dealt with by Her Majesty's navy. A surprise at the outbreak of war could thus only be attempted by such of an enemy's cruizers as could previously be assembled in or near South African waters without attracting attention, and such an attack could not be supported by an ade- quate landing force. For if the landing force is to come from men-of-war- from their crews and such few troops as could be conveniently accommodated on board-it must be remembered that a modern cruiser can not furnish more than some 250 men for such an operation, and no nation except ourselves has any considerable naval force available in these waters. Against an attack of this limited nature, the defences which are being created should suffice, provided that the local organization is so thoroughly matured as to enable the works to be manned at short notice.

4. Passing now to the detailed consideration of the Scheme, the Colonial Defence Committee observe that the Governor in his covering letter remarks that the General Officer Commanding includes in the detail of his Scheme volunteers belonging to the towns of Stellenbosch, Paarl, Wellington, Worcester, and Kimberley. From an analysis of the Scheme, it appears that the General Officer Commanding utilizes the following :-

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Strength.