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Halifax are not specially great; and it is improbable that measures to provide against such a contingency would have to be immediately enforced on the outbreak of war.

The preparation of the Halifax defences may thus conveniently be classed under two headings, viz., (a) those necessary to protect the town and harbour from any sudden raid by a naval force which might have eluded the British naval forces; and (b) those necessary to prevent the capture of the place in the event of its being seriously threatened with a land attack. It is tolerably obvious that, while the preparations to meet the former should be set on foot at the outset of a war, the measures requisite in the latter case are by no means necessarily coincident with the receipt of the instructions that war is imminent.

Although it is most desirable that the measures to be taken in the case of a threatened investment of Halifax by land should be thought out beforehand, there is no occasion to put those measures in force until the investment is actually imminent. Such measures at the very outset of war might have the effect of creating an unnecessary feeling of alarm.

Nothing, for example, would be more calculated to arouse a needless panic than, immediately on the outbreak of war, to direct the population to drive their cattle, &c., behind the fortified position at Halifax, or to destroy them on the arrival of an enemy's vessels. The issue of these instructions would be justifiable when siege or investment were actually apprehended; but before that could occur, a complete change must have taken place in the general conditions, as disclosed in the opening remarks of the Scheme; and the measures which are proposed in paragraph 7, p. 25, on the receipt of orders to prepare for defence, would be both unnecessary and injudicious until this change in the situation had taken place.

The division of the measures to be taken at Halifax into two distinct portions affects other portions of the Scheme, notably those dealing with supply and transport, signalling, and medical arrangements.

3. The utility of converting all the lighthouses given in Table (A), p. 34, into look-out stations is perhaps questionable on the ground of information alone, for an enemy in many cases would certainly arrive at or near Halifax before the information dispatched by some of the lighthouse keepers could possibly reach the town. For instance, Green Island (where there is only a light-keeper on the island, and where landing is difficult) is only 35 miles from Halifax, but a message thence would probably take five hours to reach the city.

Also, the Board of Trade have pointed out the undesirability of giving a belligerent character to lighthouses. This does not imply that information must not be obtained from lighthouse keepers, but that they should not ostensibly, or in any recognized way, be invested with a belligerent character. C (iii), Part III, pp. 32 to 36, therefore requires revision so as to omit any arrangement that would appear to give lighthouses a definite part in the defence. For instance, the discovery of the instructions (X) and (F) at p. 36 in a light- house would certainly be held to deprive it of its neutral character.

4. The Tables giving the distribution of the troops on pp. 12 and 13 should be rendered more complete, both as regards arms and ranks. Thus, the Table giving the distribution of the Imperial troops omits the Royal Engineers altogether; and it is not clear whether the officers of the Royal Artillery are included or not. The totals of Artillery (Regular and Militia) on p. 13 do not agree with the establishments on p. 12. Some explanation of the discrepancy should be given. There does not seem to be any valid reason why the distribu- tion of the officers Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, and of all the Royal Engineers rank and file, should not be given in the Table on p. 12, or why both Tables should not be combined into one.

5. The distribution of reinforcements from England given on p. 14 would come in better on p. 17, after the distribution of troops by sectional commands. 6. Pages 14 to 17. It would save some research if a Table were given at the head of each section summarizing the troops by corps at the disposal of the Section Commander.

7. Page 25. It is stated that four guard-boats will be engaged for patrolling in front of the mine-fields. The experience of late years has led to the conclu- sion that such movable guard-boats are of little practical value, and only tend to embarrass the defence. They would generally end by getting out of position,

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