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3.

This would be an additional demand which has not yet been envisaged, and for which no provision has been made in the resources at the disposal of the Government of India.

(a) A Russian air attack on North West India,

however light the scale, would add to the air defence and the internal security problems in that area and would be a further drain upon Indian resources.

(e) Even if Russian hostility does not materialise

we might wish to draw upon India for re-inforcement in the event of a sudden development of the war in the Mediterranean area, particularly if Italy became hostile.

From the point of view of imperial defence therefore

it is of the highest importance that the Government of

India should do all in its power to conserve its forces

and to avoid undertaking any commitment which is not

essential for the security of the country.

4.

Proposed Operations in the Ahmadzai Salient.

The operations now proposed by the Government of

India may be summarised as follows:

(a) The situation in North Waziristan and on

the Derajat Border is bad. Gangs have been very active in this area and war excitement appears to be on the increase. There are already signs of the extension of the disaffection northwards.

(b) The Government of India consider that

operations, by a force of two brigades, in the Ahmadzai Salient, are necessary to put a stop to the trouble and to prevent its spread northward.

(c) If these operations are undertaken, the

Government of India realise that bad characters-in the neighbouring Waziristan Tribes will probably join in the fighting but that inaction is impossible, in view of the continuance of the raiding menace in the district.

(d) Public opinion in India is indignant and

demands measures for the restoration of confidence in the district. This cannot be done nor can main communications be secured until the refuges of the gangs (i.e. the Ahmadzai Salient) have been neutralised.

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