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holes. We visited an artillery O.P. (all the artillery O.Ps. are in the front line owing to the woods) and they fired a couple of rounds at a target for my benefit. Within two minutes the expected answer was received in the shape of at least 24 rounds from the Russian guns. This was undoubtedly typical of the crushing superiority of the Russian artillery in guns and ammunition. The troops in the trenches had been there five days and looked very pale and tired.

The positions held by the Corps we visited were, with a few minor exceptions, the same as they had held from the start. It was to me quite incredible that they had been able to hold them. There had been in reality very little concrete, and defences consisted of ordinary field works and, as described above, of crater defences.

The New Frontier.

Effects of the changes in the Soviet-Finnish Frontier.

47. The following comments on the reported terms of peace are of a general nature only, as the detailed implications cannot yet be gauged.

The principal changes effected by the terms are:-

(a) Lease of Hangoe and surrounding islands to the U.S.S.R. and cession of

other islands in the Gulf of Finland to the U.S.S.R.

This enables the U.S.S.R. to dominate the Gulf of Finland, and gives her naval and air bases open all the year round and within 150 miles of the Swedish coast, thus putting her in a better position to control traffic entering and leaving the Gulf of Bothnia, of which iron-ore to Germany is the most important. The lease will also be a threat to the security of south-west Finland and to her communica- tions across the Gulf of Bothnia to Sweden.

The supply of the Russian garrison in Hangoe in winter presents certain problems as Leningrad is ice-bound from December to end of April. During this period the Russian garrison will have to be supplied either over the Finnish railways or via the Estonian railways and bases.

(b) Cession of the whole of the Karelian Isthmus and the north coast of Lake Ladoga, including the towns of Viipuri, Kakisalmi, Sortavala and Suojarvi.

(i) The Finns lose their only sound defensive position in the south- west, as the Russians will in future be able to build up a more or less continuous front of approximately 170 miles from the Gulf of Finland to Suojarvi. The maintenance of Russian forces operating on the northern fringe of Lake Ladoga will be possible by rail via Kakisalmi by two roads from the Murmansk Railway and, in summer, by boat across Lake Ladoga. Though the Finns will still be able to make use of the great chain of lakes north of Viipuri for their defences, the protection of these lakes, especially in winter, will absorb forces which they can ill afford. The best forward position for stopping a Russian drive west towards Helsinki is already turned by the strip of Russian territory along the coast west of Viipuri.

(ii) The Russian position round Lake Ladoga will be much improved as they will control the lateral railway Viipuri-Sortavala- Suojarvi. The Finnish position will be weak as rail communica- tion to the south-east frontier will be confined to the route via Kontiomaki, 250 miles north of Sortavala.

(iii) The whole of the Finnish electric grid system is centred on the barrage at Imatra and the power stations at Enso and Rouhilia. The first two of these will now lie very close to the frontier and the last has actually passed to Russia.

(iv) The Finns will lose the use of the important canal system between

Lake Ladoga and the central lakes.

(v) The Russians will gain some good timber and important saw mills.

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