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which are relevant. These, however are felt to be outside the competence of the Committee. It would be for higher authority to determine how far these other factors should affect the military order of priority and allocation of responsibilities which we might recommend for consideration.

12. Before entering into any detailed discussion with the French Representatives on the alternative lines of approach to the general problem, which are outlined above, we ask for the covering approval of the Chiefs of Staff.

13. We appreciate that our proposals do not go by any means as far as those of the French. But we think that they are more practical and within the scope of the Allied Military Committee, and it is quite possible that, treated as a first stage, they would satisfy the French. It would be undesirable to turn down the French suggestion out of hand, and moreover if any form of agreement within the more limited scope envisaged were achieved, such agreed opinion should prove of some value to the supply organisations which deal with the technical aspect of meeting Balkan demands.

14. Finally, we are impressed with the general idea underlying the French suggestion in paragraph 4 (i) of the enclosure, that the Allies should be fully aware of the war materials of every type at any time at the disposal of the Balkan forces. We do not subscribe to the suggestion that detailed lists should be prepared. This would undoubtedly cause duplication of effort. We suggest, however, for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff, that the British Intelligence Departments should examine, in direct contact with the French 2ème Bureau, the information available in this matter, and ensure that all such information is pooled, so that it would subsequently be possible for them to produce at any moment the fullest possible statement, on the condition of any individual Balkan State's armaments,

15. If the Chiefs of Staff were prepared to issue a directive to the Intelligence Departments to this effect, it would be possible for us to inform our French colleagues that their primary suggestion had not been neglected, and that the steps being taken would ensure that both France and the United Kingdom possessed all available detail, while avoiding the undesirable establishment of an information bureau outside the general intelligence organisation.

Gwydyr House, S..1,

1st March, 1940.

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(Signed) J.H. MARSHALL-CORNWALL

W. S. CHALMERS.

C.E.H. MEDHURST.

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