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There is equally little prospect of the Shah allowing us to build up an intelligence service in Persia while Persia is still unattacked, unless the Shah's needs under (A) and (B) can be amply net. We might get him to admit that without full information about Soviet activities we could not give him adequate help when he needed it, and he might undertake to provide us with such information himself. But I am afraid I all sceptical of much coming even of this much cooperation.

The point is that there has been no "change" in the Shah's attitude. It has always been sufficiently obvious that he would resist aggression if he could and that if we sat still long enough he would turn to us for help, provided this could be given or promised without compromising his neutrality. What he no dou ́t wants now are secret discussions and secret assurances (which would not, of course, have a deterrent effect on the moviet Union unless there were leakages). He would be Lost unlikely to agree to an open assurance or alliance or any activities likely to offend the Soviet Union without the most explicit guarantee, which we probably cannot give him.

As a general observation I should like to add that the Persians are likely to prove the most difficult and possibly even the most treacherous of allies. We must avoid putting Ourselves in their hands more than we can possibly help. Any cooperation between ourselves and the Persian Government will be fraught with vexation at every step. Nor must we expect that it will lead to anything but further difficulties for our interests in Persia when the immediate danger has passed, There will be no question of gratitude, and although the precise course of events will depend upon the length of the Shah's life and the extent to which the Valiahd can make good, it can be said that by and large the Persians will resent the fact that they were obliged to rely upon us in their hour of need and hold it against us, It is as well that we should realise these things fro. the outset.

Apart from the substance of the question, there is also the question of tactics. The approach made to the Lilitary Attache in Tehran is at present nothing but a feeler. If we do not respond too quickly or too fulsomely, the approach is likely to be repeated in increasingly clear terms. From many points of view it would be a good thing to make the Shah come to us with a definite request before we respond. The position which we want to establish is that it is Persia. who is asking us for assistance and not that it is we who are pressing our assistance on Persia. It is quite possible, however, that by the time the Chiefs of Staff have reported, a good many days will have elapsed and a more definite approach will have been made. There is therefore no need to take a decision about this point at present.

It might save much discussion later on if the above considerations were sent semi-officially to the Service Departments and the latter asked to take them into account when briefing the Chiefs of Staff.

We should no doubt keep the French and Turkish Government informed of what we co.

(Signed) L. BAGGALLAY.

∙10-

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