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The General Officer Commanding points out that an increase in the Period before Relief should logically be accompanied by an increase in the garrison to offset the losses incurred during the longer period. As, at the present time, no diversion of war potential, either in men, armament or warlike stores should be made to Hong Kong from our requirements vis-a-vis Germany, I feel that in the solution of this problem, we should be guided by considerations of what is practicable and possible now, rather than what is desirable as a long term policy in future. I therefore propose that this aspect put forward by the General Officer Commanding should not be considered, but that the problem be confined to that of food storage and the supply of any extra ammunition for the existing armament which can be spared now.

Food Storage.

It would obviously be useless for food supplies for a given period to be stored for the garrison, if arrangements were not made at the same time for supplies for a similar period to be held for the anticipated civilian population. Although cost and storage difficulties might preclude the holding of a full scale of rations for the civil population by the local government, a rationing scheme could be devised and put into operation from the day that supplies were interrupted, whereby civil supplies would be made to last for a far longer time than their quantity would warrant on a peace-time scale of feeding.

It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy how many Chinese are likely to be invested in the fortress. Although the local government will endeavour to evacuate as many Chinese as possible and prevent any refugees from the interior, or those living normally in Kowloon, from coming on to the island, in the event I consider it would be very difficult to put any such scheme into effect, and a considerable increase to the civilian population of the island must be expected.

A limiting factor in the storage of food for Chinese is that rice will not keep for six months in the humid climate of Hong Kong.

Another factor which has to be considered is that with the heavy scale of air attack, possibly including gas spray, to which Hong Kong is liable, some losses must be expected in the reserves of food. This of course may be partially offset by casualties.

Ammunition.

Extra ammunition can be made available immediately for the existing 3.7 inch and 3 inch A.A. guns, of which Hong Kong now have four and ten respectively, but, not for their two 4.5 inch A.A. and two Bofors guns.

The production position of .303 ammunition is well known. Since Hong Kong hold 22 million rounds, an amount which is estimated to be sufficient for a division on the Western Front for nearly 4 months, I do not consider that there is any need to send any extra until the general situation of production and stocks of this ammunition has improved.

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