CAB80-8 — Page 13

Page 13

Page 13

agreement with many of our comments. On others they put forward a series of observations. These are set out in column 3 of the Annex, which thus, we hope, presents a fairly complete picture both of what the French have in mind, and of our own views. Thus this paper supersedes the report on Allied assistance to Finland which we submitted on the 28th January, 1940 (Paper No. W.P. (40) 36) in the form of a commentary on certain proposals received from the French for the employment of Polish forces at Petsamo.

7. In the following paragraphs we invite attention to certain specific points which emerge from the exchange of views between ourselves and the French summarised in the Annex :-

Hostilities with Russia.

8. At the first meeting, the French appeared to make light of the consequences that might flow from hostilities with Russia. In fact, they appeared almost to welcome the prospect on the reasoning that :-

(a) So long as the Soviet were fully occupied in Finland, they could not be

of much help to Germany; and

(b) It would give us an opportunity of bombing the oil supply at Baku, and thus eliminate the chances of Russia being able to spare oil for Germany.

At the second meeting, we made a point of asking whether our observations on the disadvantages of hostilities with Russia (see Annex, Column 2, para- graph 3), had caused the French to modify their views. General Gamelin replied that in his opinion Russia's entry into the war had both advantages and disadvantages. He made no comment on the embarrassment which we might be caused in India and Iran, beyond saying that a good deal depended on Russia's offensive capacity, which he himself rated fairly low. He added that if and when it became certain that there would be no attack on the Western Front in the Spring, there was much to be said for opening up new fields of operation. This would enable us to mystify the German High Command, cause them to disperse their forces and bring in new allies on our own side. In addition there was a good deal to be said, from the point of view of the morale of the troops, for putting an end to the present stalemate on land.

The Infringement of Norwegian Neutrality.

9. It will be seen from the Annex, Column 1, paragraphs 9 and 10, that naval operations at Petsamo are dependent on the establishment of a base in Norwegian territorial waters, possibly in some lonely fjord; and that the French consider that the establishment of such a base can be justified as action taken in support of League of Nations' resolution to help Finland.

This is, of course, a matter for political judgment, but it seems to us that, if we are going to invoke Article 16* of the Covenant, it would be infinitely preferable, from the military point of view, to do so for the purpose of obtaining an entry into Scandinavia via Narvik. When we put this point to the French, they suggested that there was a big difference between infringing the neutrality of a recognised port, and that of a lonely fjord: but they made it clear on several occasions during the discussion (see, for example, Annex, Column 3, paragraphs 3, 4 and 10), that they preferred the Narvik project and that their only reason for suggesting the Petsamo operation was that it seemed impossible on political grounds to obtain an entry into Finland via Narvik and Lulea.

Volunteers for Finland.

10. A successful landing at Petsamo is dependent upon Finnish co-operation, and the Finns could not spare sufficient effectives for this purpose, unless their

* Extract from Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the Covenants of the League.

U

Page 13

Page 13

Page 13