CAB80-32 — Page 92

Page 92

Page 92

16

}

The need for an Aerodrome Defence Corps.

14. If it is accepted that the Royal Air Force should in future undertake the immediate and local defence of its own aerodromes, it remains to consider what permanent garrison personnel should be provided and how they should be organised.

15. It is suggested that it is not entirely sound or economical to rely, for the somewhat specialised rôle of aerodrome defence, upon forces trained and equipped as infantry. Aerodrome defence requires, in addition to A.A. defences :-

(i) The holding of defended localities, permanent defence works and fortified buildings, and the development of a considerable volume of fire over the aerodrome surface. This rôle requires as much fire power as possible to be employed from static positions. Now that it has been decided that all R.A.F. personnel are to be armed and trained in the use of weapons, we should endeavour to rely upon them to undertake the greater part of this task.

(ii) A force for hunting, "mopping-up,"

mopping-up," and counter-attacking, which requires as much mobile and protected fire power as possible.

It follows, therefore, that the forces constituting the mobile echelon should be provided with the weapons and equipment which will endow them with the greatest mobility and hitting power. Normal infantrymen are not equipped or trained to the best advantage for (ii) above.

16. The number of aerodromes to be defended is already so large that the utmost economy in man-power for defence must be achieved. Under the present system, by December 1941 there will be a total of some 136,000 infantry employed in garrisoning 560 aerodromes, while by June 1943 there will be about 750 aero- dromes which will require, on the present scales, roughly 176,000 men for defence. Man-power must therefore be conserved by the provision of the maximum mobility and fire-power. These arguments support the formation of a specialised Corps for aerodrome defence.

17. A specialised and homogeneous Aerodrome Defence Corps would permit unified direction and control of training and administration, and would ensure that these problems were kept under continuous study by a specialised staff. This would facilitate the development of a common doctrine and a standard policy. The layout of an aerodrome is by no means static; its size and shape, the number and position of its buildings and the way in which aircraft on the ground are disposed, are all liable to change. Nevertheless, changes of policy in such matters normally affect all aerodromes more or less equally, and any modifications to the defence arrangements which may become necessary are usually of general application. So long as defence is undertaken by units of the Army, no common doctrine, particularly as regards tactical detail, is likely to be achieved. Aerodromes occupied by units of each of the functional R.A.F. Commands are situated all over the country and within the boundaries of a large number of different Army authorities. The views of these authorities on aerodrome defence, as has been learnt by experience, tend to differ, and although their various methods may perhaps be equally effective, their diversity is confusing to the aerodrome users and prevents any standardisation of method.

18. Finally, the creation of a special Corps for aerodrome defence would ensure that in any future Continental or overseas expedition involving the despatch of an air contingent or an advanced air striking force, the Royal Air Force would be able to take with it the personnel required for the local defence of its bases, and the Army Expeditionary Force would be correspondingly relieved. Certain units of the Corps could, in fact, be specialised for this purpose and trained as pioneers and field engineers as well as fighting troops. They would then be able to proceed in advance of the air units to put landing grounds into a state of defence before they were taken into operational use. Unless the normal establishment of the Field Army makes provision for a number of Royal Engineer and fighting units to be available for this purpose over and above the estimated requirements for the conduct of the actual land campaign, mobile Aerodrome Defence Corps units would appear to be an essential requirement.

1

Page 92

J

I

i

k

(

Page 92

Page 92