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4. Thus, divided ressponsibility, which is unsound in theory and which in practice has been found unsatisfactory to all concerned, is an outstanding feature of the system. Not only do aerodrome garrisons consist of assorted bodies of troops with no common standard of training, but the control of the defence organisation as a whole is also divided.
5. Successful defence of an aerodrome is likely to turn at least as much upon the manner in which the plan is put into effect as upon the soundness of the principles on which it was originally based. But whereas the Army, being generally responsible for defence on land, properly lays down the policy and the tactical doctrine for the defence of aerodromes, the task of implementing that policy devolves to a very great extent upon the Royal Air Force, which provides the bulk of the material resources and a high proportion of the total personnel of the garrison. These R.A.F. resources are necessarily controlled through the R.A.F. chain of command. The Army's supervisory activities, on the other hand, are conducted through entirely different channels, and the fact that R.A.F. Commands are on "functional" basis, whereas Army Commands are geographical, has made it impossible to evolve any satisfactory method of joint supervision and control on the higher levels. Consequently, the Air Officers Commanding R.A.F. Commands and Groups, who are best qualified to co-ordinate the various forms of activity required of their Station Commanders and the uses to which their resources are put, are at present virtually excluded from exercising any useful function in those directions.
6. With a view to finding a satisfactory and acceptable solution to this unsatisfactory state of affairs, the Air Ministry have submitted certain proposals for our consideration. The main feature of the Air Ministry case, which is set out in detail in Annex V, is the formation of a self-contained Aerodrome Defence Corps, and they have stated that if the War Office do not feel able to undertake this task they would themselves be prepared to do so, provided the continued goodwill of the Army is assured and that the War Office will furnish the necessary assistance during the initial stages.
7. As between a War Office Aerodrome Defence Corps placed at the disposal of the Air Ministry and a Corps which is part of the Royal Air Force, we favour the latter. Since the Corps, as will appear later, would have to be under the executive and administrative control of the R.A.F., the War Office could not with advantage make themselves responsible for it. Whatever system is adopted for the defence of R.A.F. aerodromes should also be adopted by the Admiralty for the defence of Naval Air Stations; for convenience the figures given in this report include the naval personnel and the weapons required for the defence of Naval Air Stations.
*
8. Having reviewed the disadvantages of the present system we proceeded to an examination of what the implications of forming an Aerodrome Defence Corps would be in so far as :-
(a) Defence Unit Establishments,
(b) Man-Power,
(e) Provision of weapons, and (d) Training
are concerned. These depend primarily upon the number and character of aerodromes to be defended and the scale of defence required for each. In the first place, therefore, we reviewed in some detail the layout of aerodromes in the United Kingdom as it will be on the 1st April, 1942, having due regard to the Priorities which have already been approved by the Chiefs of Staff.
Defence Unit Establishments.
9. We then considered what personnel and weapon establishments would be required for the different types of garrison units necessary, bearing constantly in mind that a more economical use of man-power could be secured by making use of fire-power and mobility. Our recommendations in this respect are set out in detail in Annex I.
* NOTE. There are at present 14 Naval Air Stations.
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