CAB80-32 — Page 44

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ANNEX II.

Copy of a telegram dated 9th November, 1941 From Government of India, External Affairs Department to Secretary of State for India.

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6271. Addressed to Secretary of State for India repeated to Kabul No, 558.

Your telegrams 13987 November 4th and 13976 November 5th.

2. We cannot disguise our dislike of prospect now disclosed. We have from outset been opposed to any such project for geographical political and strategical reasons alike and have been concerned to stress the essential differences between Persia and Afghanistan and need for a different approach to problems which may appear similar. Method of rapidly exploiting comparatively mild behest as step to far-reaching demand will not in our opinion work in Afghanistan and in this form might involve India in extensive hostilities in Afghanistan and tribal areas involving heavy commitments in troops and open the way for renewed charges of British ill-faith throughout the Moslem world,

3. In our (view) it is unthinkable to take the risks involved in (corrupt group) of developing a supply route which on favourable estimate could only carry 2,000 tons a month. Apart from Political considerations transport is not available to work such route without diversion from other theatres. Foresee- able Military lorries deficit by end December 1941 is roughly 8,000 on orders already placed and for military reasons we cannot afford to increase it. Nor can we draw further (? on) existing civil (corrupt group) or future civil quota.

4. We note that H.M.Government have no present intention of making demands but in a matter such as this after assurances which have been given Afghans will not easily appreciate difference between a "demand" and a "request for co-operation" and to anticipate Afghan Government acquiescence amounts we fear to self deception. We doubt if it has been realised how providential the outcome has so far been of our request for expulsion of Axis Nationals. If all goes well it would seem that next objective must be the elimination of Axis-Legations from Afghanistan while maintaining a stable government in that country and a peaceful frontier.

5. Even if eventual development of supply routes were in view, we think that Legations must go before it can be consider- ed. Elimination of Legations will be difficult task but as it does not involve physical encroachment on Afghan territory may not be impossible of achievement.

~~3~

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