CAB80-32 — Page 323

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262

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK ANE

it is requested that special care niuy be tak ensure the secrecy of this document

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECREThis document was considered at cos(433~

C.0.S. (41) 752.

23RD DECEMBER, 1941.

WAR CABINIT.

Meeting.

COPY NO.

33

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

NEUTRALITY OF SAUDI ARABIA.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General

Staff.

Replies to Chiefs of Staff Telegram No, 210 which was sent as a result of the Chiefs of Staff decision on the 12th December have now been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and the Commander-in-Chief, India, It is possible without waiting for a reply from G.0.0., Iraq, to form a definite view on the desirability of persuading Ibn Saud to contract an open alliance with us.

The advantages of an Anglo-Saudi Arabian alliance can be summarised as follows:-

(1) The opportunity of developing an alternative land L. of

C. from Kuwait to Amman.

(2) The more effective policing of Trans-Jordan

Saudi frontier and the Saudi-Yemen frontier.

Iraqi

(3) The opportunity of developing and using aerodromes on the Saudi Arabian Persian Gulf coast and in northern Saudi Arabia.

(4) The opportunity of developing air routes across Saudi

Arabia.

(5) Increased security against Axis activities in the Red

Sea area.

(6) A useful counter to Axis propaganda in the Moslem world.

(7) An open declaration by Ibn Saud would have a steadying

effect upon the attitude of the Arab tribes in the Middle Euphrates and in southern Iraq and upon the Syrian nomad tribes with all of whom his influence is considerable.

The sole military disadvantage is the possibility that Ibn Saud would immediately make requests to us for arms and equipment which we should find difficulty in supplying.

It is, however, the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, India, that these requests would not be great. In fact Ibn Saud has no large army which he is attempting to equip and he would not be called upon to provide troops to take part in Allied operations.

#C.0.S. (41) 419th Mtg. Min.3,

Tel. GJP/39106:17/12.

ZTel. 21201/G:18/12.

-1-

nd

This document was considered at Co..(4) 33 Meeting.

Min. 6.

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