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TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this dicu meet.

A 260

С

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SECRET.

C.O.S. (41) 751.

21ST DECEMBER, 1941.

33

COPY NO.

This do........ was considered at C.0.5) 50 Meeting.

WAR CABINET.

(41) 43,0

30 Min.6.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

OPERATIONS BY THE KURDS.

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Note by the Secretary.

C.0.S. (41) 421st Meeting. Minute 6)

751

(Previous Reference:

The Chiefs of Staff invited the Foreign Office to examine the proposal that the basis for agreement between the Persians and the Kurds might be found in the appointment of a Kurdish Governor of Kurdistan with a British Political Officer to advise.

2.

The Foreign Office have replied as follows:

Xיי

X

X

X

X

In general, we feel that the less we are obliged to intervene or mediate between the Kurds and the Persians, the better. We realise that the situation may become so serious that we shall be forced to do something about it.

It is by no means certain, however, that things have reached that stage.

Our reasons for advocating this policy of non- intervention are that, as Bullard pointed out in his Telegram No. 55 to Kermanshah of the 25th October, it is difficult for us to interveno without giving encouragement to the Kurds, and arousing the suspicions not only of the Persian Government, but also of the Turkish Government, and of the Soviet Government. We must not give the Kurds any reason to suppose that we would support them in future against attempts by the Persian Authorities to exercise their authority, maintain order or collect taxation in Persian Kurdistan. The Persians would suspect us (if we intervened) of supporting a Kurdish independence movement for our own purposes. The Turks have already expressed to us their suspicions that we are encouraging a Kurdish insurrectionary movement, and have made it clear in their aide-memoire of 11th December (see Angora Telegram No. 2916 of 14th December) that, in the Turkish view, nothing could be more dangerous than Persian negotiations with the Kurdish rebel leaders, which must necessarily involve unspecified concessions to the rebels. As for the

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