CAB80-32 — Page 206

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35. The increased pressure first made itself felt in the north, and on the 28th September the Italian outpost commander at Wolchefit surrendered with 3,000 men, about half of them Italian.

The road from Wolchefit to the south had, however, been heavily mined and it was some weeks before the 25th East African Brigade were in front of the enemy's next position, just north of Wolaich.

Meanwhile the 26th East African Brigade had been relieved from the blockade of French Somaliland and arrived in the Gondar area during the first week of October. The conduct of all the operations was then taken over by Major-General C. C. Fowkes, G.O.C., 12th African Division.

Original Plan.

36. General Fowkes's original plan was to deliver the main attack from the south-east along the Debra Tabor-Gondar road with the 25th and 26th East African Brigades, supported by 16 guns, with the object of seizing the road junction south of Azozo and then destroying the various enemy groups in detail.

In addition, three subsidiary advances were to take place as follows:- (a) From the north, along the Wolchefit-Gondar road by two battalions with

four guns.

(b) From the south, along the western shore of Lake Tana, by an Ethiopian

battalion.

(c) From the west, along the Gallabat-Chelga road by a Sudan Defence

Force Battalion with two guns.

Patriot forces were to co-operate with all four columns.

Air support was to be provided by:---

One squadron Mohawk fighters

One squadron Hartebeeste army co-operation aircraft One squadron mixed bombers

of the R.A.F. and South African Air Force.

The advance of the main column was to be delayed until the subsidiary advances had created the greatest possible diversion of the enemy's forces. The whole operation was timed to begin during the first week of November.

Plan of attack revised.

37. By the beginning of November, however, it became apparent that owing to the unexpectedly heavy and late rains, the road Debra Tabor-Gondar would not be capable of maintaining a force of two brigade groups, while there were indications that the enemy in the Wolaich position were ripe for attack from the north. It was therefore decided to alter the plan and direct the main attack along the Wolchefit-Gondar road, carrying out a containing attack, with one battalion only, in the south-east.

Owing to the delayed arrival of some essential guns from the Middle East, the attack was finally postponed until the third week in November.

Progress of the Operations.

38. Details of the advance on Gondar have not yet been received and it is therefore difficult to present a connected picture of the operations. It appears, however, that since the capture of Wolchefit the 25th and 26th East African Brigades had been steadily moving south as fast as repairs to the road would permit.

39. While the main body was thus slowly advancing, patrols and patriot bands maintained constant offensive activity in front of the enemy's position astride the road on the natural defensive lines Wolaich-Ambazzo. The enemy were also subjected to continued attacks from the air. As a result of these operations a number of the local tribal chieftains, who had hitherto sided with the Italians, joined our forces, and by the 17th November Kamant Hill and Ventincinque, important outposts of the enemy's position, had been captured.

Meanwhile, the 25th East African Brigade had been side-stepped to the south-east with the object of severing the line of communication between Gondar and the enemy positions in the Feroaber-Kulkaber area. This force occupied Zagadi, 10 miles north of Kulkaber, on the 19th November; and two days later Kulkaber was captured with 2,300 prisoners. The garrison of the Feroaber position was thus isolated.

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