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available for conversion. The present rate of conversion is one per month, and although the Ministry of Supply hope to be able to accelerate this to some extent, no firm figures better than these can yet be given. Hence, in about two years' time, or earlier if increased capacity can be found, it will be necessary to start building new mountings. The question arises whether we should continue to accept the 9.2-inch gun as the biggest counter-bombardment weapon at ports open to bombardment by capital ships. It has hitherto been held that although the 9.2-inch gun has not sufficient range, and does not fire a sufficiently heavy shell to ensure immunity from bombardment, the shortage of capital ships in the hands of our actual or potential enemies, and the unlikelihood of their being risked against strong fortresses, enable us to count upon the 9.2-inch weapon as a sufficient deterrent at all ports except Singapore.
8. The Port Defence Committee have considered the question afresh, and they are of the opinion that larger guns should eventually be installed at Gibraltar, Freetown, Malta and Alexandria, which are the principal ports abroad at which bombardment by capital ships can be considered at all likely. Hong Kong, Trinidad and Bermuda might come into the same category; but the Committee feel that Hong Kong is sufficiently provided for at present with the 9.2-inch (35) equipments which are already installed, and the defence of Trinidad and Bermuda is so linked with that of the U.S.A. that the provision by us of very large guns would hardly seem necessary.
9. The planning and preparations for production of these large equipments take a long time, and it is for this reason that the Chiefs of Staff are now asked to decide in principle whether guns of larger calibre than 9-2-inch should be provided at any or all of the four ports referred to in paragraph 8 above. As soon as the decision is given, it will be possible to pursue enquiries with the Ministry of Supply as to the possibilities of-
(a) The planning of a new coast defence equipment of larger than 9.2-inch calibre, to come into production as soon as possible, but without inter- fering with the output of 9.2-inch (35°) equipments; or
(b) The production of a redesigned mounting for ten 13.5-inch naval guns which are available from Admiralty sources. The Committee are informed that a 14-inch shell is necessary to perforate the citadel of a modern capital ship, so that these 13-5-inch guns would fall slightly short of the requirement. The production of the redesigned mounting would also be a long process, and could probably not start for a long time without competing with other more important work, but would presumably be quicker than building a complete new type of equipment.
(c) Modernisation of Counter-bombardment batteries at home ports.
10. A further point, on which a decision is required, is whether to proceed with the modernisation of the counter-bombardment batteries at home. In the total in paragraph 6 above 25 equipments were included for home ports; but up to the present time no authority exists for expenditure on modernising the batteries for which these equipments would be required and which are situated at the Forth, the Tyne, the Tees, the Humber, Harwich, Thames and Medway and Plymouth.
11. Before the war, the modernisation of these batteries had been approved in principle, but the expenditure was not sanctioned. It was held that the likelihood of bombardment at home, where the squadrons of Bomber Command would be available at short notice to engage enemy warships approaching the coast, was remote. The situation was judged to be different from that of ports abroad, where in most cases reliance would have to be placed entirely upon the coast defences to repel bombardment attack. If it were decided to proceed with the modernisation of these batteries at home, it could only be done at the expense of the present programme for ports abroad, or after the most important of their requirements had been fulfilled. The Admiralty point out that the Germans are prepared to take big risks, and that it cannot be ensured that enemy ships will not bombard our ports in spite of the risk of damage from air attack. The Port Defence Committee therefore ask for the guidance of the Chiefs of Staff as to whether or not the modernisation of counter-bombardment batteries at home ports,
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