CAB80-25 — Page 451

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TO DE KINDER LOOK & KEY.

be taken to It is requested that special on n

ensure the secrecy of this document.

Св

373

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

C. 0.3.(41)21.

COPY NO. 33

This dooit was considered at Cp..(4) 52 Meeting.

10TH FEBRUARY, 1941.

AR CABINET.

CHIFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,

COMMAND IN THE ORKNEYS AND SHETLANDS.

Memorandum by the Chief of Neval Staff..

The Admiral Commanding Orkney and Shetland has been consulted in accordance with Conclusion (a) to Item 4 of the minutes of the C.0. S. (41) 24th Mtg. held on 20th January, 1941.

2.

As the result of his reply, and my further consideration on this subject, I would ask that consideration may be given to the following.

3.

Orkney and Shetland are geographically isolated from the main defence system of Great Britain. The primary reason for the high scale of defences which at present exists, and for which adequate anti-invasion forces are required, is to provide security for the Main Fleet Base.

4. It is unlikely in the event of invasion of these Islands, that even under good conditions of weather and visibility any reinforcement of Ground Troops could arrive in less than 12 hours from the time of request. Under bad weather conditions this time might be considerably increased. A delay of twelve hours might well give the enemey such an opportunity to establish himself that reinforcement would be of the nature of an independent operation to recapture the Islands. For this reason alone it is of great importance that the infantry and Coast Defence garrisons of the Islands should be of sufficient strength and independently self- supporting to be able to defeat the invader before he can establish a foothold. There would therefore in practice appear to be no reason why the garrison should not continue to be an independent force under the limited operational control of the local Commanders. It is, however, essential that adequate forces should permanently be available in the Islands to deal with the anticipated scale of attack.

5.

ven though the above arguments may not be fully agreed, no reason is seen why an arrangement for providing re-inforcements for the Islands should affect the arrange- ments for local operational control with which A. C. 0.3. is at present vested. It is pointed out that even when the anti-invasion garrison is strengthened, by far the greater proportion of the Army forces will consist of units of the A. A. Command. Under the terms of the revised Annex A. C. 0.3. would, in operational matters directly affecting the defence of the fortress, be dealing with Commander, Orkney and

*

Annex I and II.

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