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NOTE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN.

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Next to the defence of this island the most important issue is the command of the Mediterranean. To secure this more fully, so as to be able to pass convoys regularly through it, is the condition precedent to any large scale operations whether against Italy or in the Balkans. To prevent this by effective air domination of the Sicily Channel is likely to be Germany's immediate aim.

To attain this she will endeavour either to seize Malta or at least so to smash up its aerodromes as to make it incapable of playing any further active part. To prevent the attack upon Malta from being interferred with by us whether by sea or air it will be of the first importance for her to make Tripoli a strong air and cruiser and submarine base. Given time she is therefore likely to slip across to Tripoli the ground services of a substantial air force as well as a stiffening of German troops. Her success in these moves would make sure of her control of Italy and of her power to crush resistance in the Balkans.

By advancing to Benghazi Wavell will have secured a useful port and air base and a position defended on the land side by the long desert stretch round the Gulf of Sidra, On the other hand he would still be over 400 miles from Malta, too far for effective air or sea help in the Sicily Channel, and liable to continuous air menace from the increasing enemy air force in Tripoli.

On the other hand if he could get to Tripoli and establish his advanced base there he would be within 200 miles of Malta and within 300 miles of the western entrance of the Sicily Channel and of most of Sicily itself, and so in an infinitely better position to help Malta and our convoys and to close the whole eastern half of the Mediterranean altogether. In the event of French North Africa coming in with us he would be in a position to push up at once to Tunis and Bizerta.

4

Once in possession of Tripoli no large land force would be required to hold any of Libya itself. The Italian settlers can be used as prisoners to build roads and the Arabs will be only too glad to see the Italian forces driven out. Apart from troops destined for a possible further advance to Tunis or for Sicily second line infantry and a small motorised force should be able to hold the whole coast and line of communications.

The argument for pushing on to Tripoli is therefore very strong indeed, if it can be done. Presumably the armoured and motorised troops could push along the coast road while the slower moving units could be transported from Tobruk or Benghazi by sea. Against such an advance, with his rear always threatened from the sea, it is difficult to see where Graziani could afford to make a stand except at Tripoli itself. The distances to be faced are very great and the transport problem difficult, but against a weakened and demoralised enemy before Germany can ship her air establishments across the enterprise should be feasible.. The results should prove of incalculable importance.

W

26th January, 1941,

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(Initialled) L.S.A.

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