CAB80-25 — Page 257

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el

This document was considered at D.J. (41) 28° Meeting.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

CRE

requested that special care may be tak

ensure the secrecy of this docume

C.O.S.(41 51.

22ND JANUARY, 1941 ·

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

33

COPY NO.

211

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1.

DEFENCE OF HONG KONG.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial

General Staff.

I.

In a telegram No. G.H.Q.F.E. 222 dated 18th January, 1941, to the Chiefs of Staff the Commander-in-Chief Far East elaborates his reasons for wishing to reinforce Hong Kong by two battalions as soon as he judges that these units can be released from Malaya.

2. His previous telegram on this matter was circulated as C.O.S.(41) 18 dated 7th January, 1941. It was considered by the Committee (0.0.S.(41) 16th Meeting Item 2) with my Memorandum C.0.S.(41) 28 dated 10th January, 1941 and with a Minute by the Prime Minister which was attached as Annex I to the Memorandum. The Committee then approved the despatch of the tele gram to the Commander-in-Chief which was attached as Annex II to the Memorandum and in which the Committee adhered to their decision of November, 1940, that the despatch of infantry reinforcements to Hong Kong could not be made in present circumstances.

3.

The Commander-in-Chief now produces good arguments to prove that the existing garrison is too weak to succeed in defending Hong Kong for any length of time against a determined attack. That, however, is a matter which is not in dispute.

Where the Commander-in-Chief does apparently differ rom the Chiefs of Staff is in his view of the value of Hong Kong in the event of war with Japan. This is revealed in paragraph 8 of his telegram when he refers to the Fortress being "of great value in taking offensive action at a later stage of the war".

In paragraph 2 of the telegram attached at Annex II to C.0.S.(41) 28 the Chiefs of Staff stated that "we have no good reason for basing plans on a relief of the garrison being possible". I consider that we should adhere to this view.

51

Annex II.

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