CAB80-20 — Page 77

Page 77

Page 77

63

Page 77

10.

We do not therefore consider that the risk of interception would necessarily be a limiting factor as regards the size of an invading force. Given favourable conditions: successful evasion is possible. Nevertheless there

will always remain a grave risk of the complete destruction of the expedition during the sea passage. Losses might also be expected from our minefields. The prospects of interception would bc lessoned if the invasion vero undertaken as a diversion. Forces Available.

11. Ample land forces are available and even the loss of the whole expedition would not materially affect Germany's military position.

Port Facilities.

12.

Ports of Embarkation.

(a) French Ports.

The GIRONDE.

LOIRE BREST LORIENT

A

The anchorage and facilities for loading are virtually unlimited. major expedition could easily be assembled here, and loaded in comparative security. Considerable rail movement to the port would be necessary, which might disclose the preparations.

Facilities for loading are limited, and a major expedition sailing from these ports alone would have to load in relays, with consequent delay. Preparations might be discovered by air reconnaissance, and hampered by air attack.

(b) orwegian and Baltic Ports.

Though embarkation facilities are unlimited and ideally placed in the Baltic we do not consider that a major expedition would be sailed from these ports owing to the longer sea voyage, and greater danger of interception. Shipping for only one division is stated to be available in Norwegian Ports, and this would be more likely to be employed for a diversion elsewhere.

Disembarkation.

13.

It is evident from the foregoing paragraphs that the scale of attack upon Eire would neither be limited by the availability of forces and shipping, nor by the embarkation facilities. As we have already pointed out, in paragraph 4(c) above, a major port or ports would be required for disembarkation of the main force.

-10-

Page 77

Page 77