CAB80-20 — Page 62

Page 62

I.S.S.B.NO.60(1)8.

Page 62

ANNEX.

48

I.S.S.B.

ANTI-INVASION MEASURES:

PREPARATION FOR A FEINT INVASION.

Memorandum by the Inter-Services Security Board.

on the

The Chiefs of Staff at their meeting 21st September, 1940, had under consideration a suggestion that it might be desirable to collect a number of barges and other vessels in a port of Scotland which would give the appearance of preparation for an invasion of Norway. Dummy boats might be used. If the port selected was out of range of enemy fighters it might afford us an opportunity of inflicting casualties on enemy bombers.

24.9.40.

2.

We considered a somewhat similar suggestion made by the Director of Plans, Admiralty, in August. It was then suggested that a counter-invasion threat against Norway should be put out as a rumour, and as a threat to the . cnemy's security.

3. We then expressed the opinion that any operation which we wished the enemy to think we are about to under- take must be one that is not only possible to perform, but also probable. From experience of the autumn months in the mountainous districts of Norway, we considered that it would be quite impracticable to commence a campaign involving the invasion of Norway at this time of the year. We could not therefore believe that the enemy would be deceived for a moment by any rumour that we might put out or by any dummy preparations that we might make to give the appearance that such action was probable.

وریا کے

At the same time we suggested that German troops and aircraft might be "contained" by constant threats of feasible operations, such as naval raids on Trondheim.

5.

For the same reasons, we think that the present proposal is unlikely to lead to the desired result, namely, attack on concentration points in Scotland by bombers. It is possible that if the plan were worked up as a raid of the Zeebrugge type, the enemy might seek to destroy it by bombing before embarkation, rather than by defeat on arrival,

6.

The Germans will know that we have not sufficient troops to carry out a scrious invasion at the same time as defending Great Britain. Norwegian troops might, however, be used for a raid. It would, however, in our view be nécessary to collect the shipping and move the Norwegian troops to the concentration point. Doubtless the G.A.F. would reconnoitre the concentration, and a bombing attack, if launched at all, would be launched shortly before, in German estimation, the force was about to sail. It would, therefore, be necessary to carry preparations almost to the point of sailing.

We are not optimistic that the desired result will be obtained, and it is for consideration whether the off-chance of shooting down a few German bombers would justify the considerable preparations which would be required.

(Signed) E.P. COMBE.

Major.

for Chairman,

Inter-Services Security Board.

C.0.S.319th Meeting, Minute 4.

Page 62

Page 62

Page 62