CAB80-20 — Page 53

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ANNEX III.

42

No. 2146.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams No. 2383 and 2409.

I had a discussion this morning with Secretary of State as to American view of Berlin and Rome Tokyo pact. Mr.Hull said that he had long been convinced that there was an underground agreement between the three aggressor Powers and that the signing of the pact therefore did not in his opinion change the fundamentals of the position, though it had come as a shock to American public opinion. It would certainly make no difference to the policy of the Administration. Policy of the Administration was to give all possible help to Britain which was the main theatre of the war between the three Axis Powers and the Democracies and to maintain unchanged its policy of resistance in all practical ways short of war to Japanese aggressica in the Far East.

As regards assistance to Great Britain the effect of the pact had been to drive the Administration to the conclusion that the immediate necessity was to build up American production of armaments in all possible ways as Lord Beaverbrook had done for air in England, so that supplies available for Great Britain should, if possible, be larger and available sooner than had been expected.

As regards the Far East, Mr. Hull said that the United States Government had already cut off scrap, and that machine toks would now be unavailable for Japan because of the immensity of the demands for American defence and Hornbeck told me that the oil question was dropping out of favour because of its effect on the Dutch and that the United States Government were working out all necessary details in case United States Government decided to restrict the purchase of silk from Japan.

I then discussed with Mr. Hull the Burma Road question on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 2383. Mr. Hull, while inflexible in his determination to resist Japanese aggression, is anxious to avoid any crisis in the Far East which might have the effect of diminishing supplies to Great Britain. He clearly thought His Majesty's Government should not denounce the Burma Road Agreement before its expiry on 18th October as a needless provocation. On the other hand, he said definitely that the United States Government hoped that His Majesty's Government would not agree to closing the road after that date if only because the United States Government were anxious that everything possible should be done to keep China in the firing line. If His Majesty's Government share this view, he thought it would be a good plan to notify Japanese Government at once that we did not intend to renew agreement in order to avoid a second crisis three weeks hence. I asked him whether he thought that refusal to renew the agreement would precipitate an armed attack on us by Japan. He said he did not think so unless Japan was already determined for other reasons to precipitate a conflict. I then asked him what support United States would be prepared to give us if Japan attacked because we re-opened the Road. As usual Mr. Hull gave the answer which is inevitable for constitutional reasons. He could enter into no pledge of any kind. At the same time he reiterated the intention of His Government to maintain opposition to Japanese aggression especially by economic means, and at the end of the conversation he asked whether it would not be possible for the United States, Australia and Dutch and ourselves to have private staff discussions immediately on technical problems which would be involved in common action for defence, though it must be perfectly clear that these conversations were to be technical and not to concern themselves with political policy.

See my immediately following telegram.

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