CAB80-20 — Page 44

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14.

The ports in Bire with facilities for unloading M.T.

and guns are as follows:

33

Port.

Berths available.

Alongside.

In the anchorage.

(i

Queenstown and Cork

Ample

Ample

(ii) Kingstown and Dublin

6-10

Nil

(iii) Rosslare

(iv) Waterford

3- 4 4

Nil

5-6

Note. Limerick has extensive quays with cranes and a deep water dock but the harbour is narrow and shallow and access is restricted by tides. It is not therefore regarded as suitable for this purpose.

Ports in St. George's Channel and the Irish Sea are unlikely to be selected owing to their proximity to our own naval and air bases. It would therefore appear that Cork is the only suitable major port. We have accordingly made a detailed examination of its capacity and have reached the conclusion that a force of five divisions, some of which would be armoured, could be disembarked there, the fighting portion in one week and its reserve of stores in three weeks. Cork is a defended port, however, and the Irish may be expected to put up some resistance and to delay the process of disembarkation.

Judging from our experience of German methods and of their achievements in Norway, it must be expected that their tank formations, supported by units of motorcycle and lorry borne infantry, would endeavour to make a considerable bound forward in the first 48 hours. This bound is unlikely to be less than 50 miles, and might be considerably greater if fuel supplies were captured at the ports of disembarkation.

Subsidiary Landings.

15. We consider that a diversion by mechanised forces, landing on to beaches from specialised craft, could be attempted in Donegal with the object of immobilising our forces in Northern Ireland. But such a diversion could not be in the form of a sustained effort, owing to the certainty of naval interception after the landing of the first flight, and owing to the limitations imposed by the use of special craft. We think that an attempt to land in Ulster itself would not be practicable in the face of the concentration of our light naval forces in the North Western approaches. Subsidiary landings may, however, be undertaken simultaneously with the main effort at widely dispersed points on the south and west coasts,

16. We have also considered the possibilities of the enemy seizing the defences and port of Cork and other key points throughout Ireland by air-borne troops, combined with "5th Column" action, and we think that such operations constitute a danger to the defences.

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