CAB80-20 — Page 317

Page 317

277

ENCLOSURE TO ANNEX II.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM NO. 3o FROM SIR H. KNATCHBULL HUGESSEN ISTANBUL TO FOREIGN OFFICE DATED 14TH OCTOBER, 1940.

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 1057 instructed me to represent to the Turkish Government the possibilities arising from the decisions taken at the Brenner meeting and in particular the possibility of an arrangement between Germany and Italy for an early attack in the Mediterranean and through the Balkans and Anatolia in the direction of the Suez Canal (invasion of the United Kingdom having been postponed until next spring).

2.

In view of these possible developments, Turkey will occupy a key position and we are almost certain to be confronted with a request for additional support especially in aircraft and anti-tank and A.A. guns and searchlights. Indeed paragraph 7 of your telegram under reference anticipates such a request.

3.

I fully realise the necessity for giving priority to British forces in the Middle East though I feel that in deciding what can be done for Turkey, it will be necessary to strike true balance between the importance of requirements of Egypt and the

In addition to importance of stiffening up Turkish attitude.

the effect on Turkey there would, I submit, be considerable effect on the Axis powers if we were able to afford further substantial assistance to Turkey at the present time over and above that already promised.

4.

As regards the type of additional assistance to be afforded, I would most strongly recommend that if an offer can be made it should take the form not of further equipment for Turkey's use over and above grp. undec.7 requirements already promised, but of complete British units of arms, mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the Turks are very far from being able to use either tactically or technically the large amount of British equipment already supplied to them and would certainly be unable to deal with more by the spring. The Military Attache estimates that the relatively small bodies of British technical troops would be far more effective and economical. I should however add that the political effect of cutting down our supplies already promised would be very serious.

5.

My Naval Attache is not here so I have not dealt with the naval side of the question.

6.

Please repeat Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and Middle East Cairo in India or other safe cypher.

-6-

Page 317

Page 317

Page 317

Page 317