CAB80-20 — Page 231

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EXTRACT FROM SHANGHAI SUMMARY NO.62 DATED 2.7.40.

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3.

THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION AND THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG

One of the greatest problems connected with the defence of Hong Kong against a powerful Japanese attack, is that created by the existance of a tightly-packed population of some two million Chinese.

The vast majority of this population may be fairly described as docile and law-abiding, but it is of extremely timid nature, and thus liable to panic in the event of heavy and continuous air raids, or of extensive rumour-mongering by enemy agents. It is assumed in some quarters that this problem will largely solve itself by voluntary large-scale evacuation at the first sign of danger or by dispersal into the surrounding countryside and hills when the attacks begin, but this expectation is based on mere guesswork and has no basis of fact. Even if true, it would automatically deprive us of the services of a large number of skilled labourers, dockyard hands, motor fitters, engineers drivers and household servants whose services must be retained.

The advocates of the "voluntary dispersal" theory base their opinion on the precedents of Nanking, Canton, Hankow and other large centres of population which were voided of all or part of their inhabitants when the Japanese advance came really close. CANTON is the classical example, where over a million people left in a single day. The supporters of this theory forget however that wholesale evacuation was much casier in these cases than in that of Hong Kong, as the evacuees in the former instances had the whole of the interior of China to go to; whereas here the Japanese would be surrounding the Colony on all sides and would certainly "shoot-up" all refugees trying to escape,

The thus forcing them to recoil back on the defences. jamming of roads by refugees was one of the causes of the French defeat last month, and it will be difficult to avoid a repitition of similar scenes hero although the effect should not be so fatal as it is not a case of mobile warfare pure and simple.

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Nor it this all. Even if the Chinese do not flee, or if they attempt to do so and are repelled, they will undoubtedly infost the hillsides in the island and on Kowloon camping out in the thickets and bushes in order to avoid the bombing. In view of their filthy insanitary habits and the hot summer weather, this can only result in a vast outbreak of cholera, plague, dysentry, typhoid or other diseases, which may easily spread to a portion of the defence forces. Furthermore the presence of these bona-fide refugees on the hillsides will undoubtedly impede the work of the defenders, quite apart from the opportunity thus afforded to "fifth-columnists" to start fires, sabotage or other subversive activities.

Even if we are successful in evacuating a large part of the Chinese population (and it will have to be a large part in order to have any good effect) no arrangements exist, so far as is known, for preventing the exit of the essential services workers, such as those enumerated above, whilst letting the useless mouths go.

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