CAB80-13 — Page 93

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17.

It is most unlikely that any military use of

these possessions would be made by the Italians or Germans. It is considered that their continued neutrality could be safely left to the operation of the Monroe doctrine, a contention which is perhaps confirmed by a recent resolution of the United States Congress that the United States of America would not tolerate the transfer of any colonial possessions in America of a European power to any non-American power.

18.

The present French commitment in Aruba would have to be assumed by the Canadians, ourselves, or by the United States of America.

OTHER TERRITORIES.

French Somaliland.

if not

It would

19. Italian occupation of French Somaliland will probably be rapidly carried out from Abyssinia already carried out before the French collapse. give the Italians a base at Djibouti (connected by rail with Addis Abada) only 150 miles from Aden. Italian activities would, however, be a wasting asset as their forces could not be reinforced except by air so long as we hold our position on the Canal. In any event our position in the Red Sea would not be materially effected and the threat would not be serious enough to warrant any special action.

Syria.

20. Syria and Lebanon are Republic under French Mandate. The occupation of these territories by enemy forces would have most serious strategic consequences since it would cut our land communications with Turkey and

would immediately threaten the whole of our interests in the Middle East. Moreover, the capture of Beirut with its oil supplies would provide the enemy with a valuable base in the Eastern Mediterranean,

21. We consider that it would be important to our whole position in the Middle East to prevent the enemy from establishing themselves in Syria. This might be achieved in the following ways:-

(a)

(b)

Firstly, the local French forces, which

are considerable, might decide to resist. Every effort should be made to induce them to do so.

Secondly, Turkey as an active ally, might

restrain the Italians from an actual attack or might occupy Syria and resist the attack. It does not at present seem likely, however, that Turkey will declare herself openly as a belligerent.

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