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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

сг

305

SECRET.

C.0.S.(40) 494

26TH JUNE, 1940.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

COPY NO.

37

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DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO IRAQ.

Memorandum by the Chief of the

Imperial General Staff.

The situation in Iraq is not satisfactory. Conditions have deteriorated and anti-British propaganda, encouraged by the collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war, is increasing. The prestige of the Axis Powers is high, while that of the Allies is correspondingly low.

The War Office has discussed with the Foreign Office

In the what steps should be taken to improve matters. opinion of the Foreign Office, if heavy pressure was brought to bear on the Iraq Government to take action against the supporters of our enemies, the Government might fall and a situation would arise in which we might be compelled to send troops into the country to restore order. To prevent such an event, the Foreign Office would like to see British forces in Iraq now.

2.

494

The

To date, the War Office has been unwilling to agree to this suggestion, but a new situation has now arisen. factors on which a decision must depend are:-

The

(a) We are now at war with Italy, and our communication:

through the Red Sea are by no means secure. overland route through Iraq from Basra to Palestine becomes, therefore, increasingly important for the

The transportation of personnel and material. Iraq Army is responsible for the protection of the railway from Basra to Bagdad, but, in present circumstances, its reliability is doubtful.

(b)

흐흐

It may be necessary to maintain internal security in Iraq.

(c) Should conditions demand it, we may have to move

rapidly to protect the Abadan refinery against sabotage.

(a)

The move of forces from the Middle East to Iraq would be regarded by the Arab States as a sign of weakness, and might have an effect exactly opposite to that desired. If, however, the troops come

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