CAB80-13 — Page 326

Page 326

303

To:-

1.

ANNEX I.

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Government of Australia.

Copy to Government of New Zealand

(for information).

In spite of the deterrent effect of Japan's

military commitments in China, the possible hostility of the United States of America and Russia and our military and economic strength, there are indications that Japan may be contemplating moves to improve her strategic and economic position. While it is not thought that war with Japan is necessarily imminent, the Chiefs of Staff are reviewing Far East strategy. Their views are briefly as follows:

2.

Security of our Imperial interests in Far East lies ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in South Western Pacific for which purpose adequate fleet must be based at Singapore. We appreciate your anxiety in respect of the despatch of a Fleet to Singapore. Since our previous assurances in this respect, however, the whole strategic situation has been radically altered by the French defeat. Naval dispositions are now dependent on retaining in European waters sufficient Naval forces to match both German and Italian Fleets. In present circumstances, therefore, we cannot send a Fleet to the Far East.

3.

Meantime strategic importance to us of Far East both for Empire security and to enable us to defeat enemy by control of essential commodities at source has increased.

4.

Japanese advance in China and Hainan has increased threat to Malaya and any further advance into French Indo- China, Dutch possessions or Thailand would endanger still more our position at Singapore which is the key point in Far East. Owing to increased range of aircraft and development of aerodromes, particularly in Thailand, we can no longer concentrate on defence of Singapore Island alone but must consider defence of Malaya as a whole, particularly

For this reason security of up-country landing grounds.

and because we cannot spare a fleet for the Far East at present, it is all the more important that we should do what we can to improve our land and air defences in Malaya.

5.

In your telegram No. 290 of 13th June you mention

The the possibility of supplying further land forces. Chiefs of Staff consider that the urgent move of one Division and two Squadrons aircraft to Malaya is desirable

They ask particularly as an added immediate deterrent. whether one Division equipped as fully as possible, could be made available, drawing if necessary on your militia pool of equipment. They consider that employment in Malaya would for the time being at any rate be in best interests of the Empire.

6.

If owing to equipment or other difficulties you cannot make a whole division immediately available, Chiefs of Staff recommend move by brigade groups as they become ready.

-3-

Page 326

Page 326

Page 326