CAB80-13 — Page 304

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reviewing

2.

281

To:-

1.

ANNEX I.

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Government of Australia,

Copy to Gorovment of New Zealand

(for information).

spite

In reepeet of the deterrent effect of Japan's military commitments in China, the possible hostility of the United States of America and Russia and our military and economic strength, there are indications that Japan may be contemplating moves to improve her strategic and economic position. While it is not thought that war with Japan is necessarily imminent, the Chiefs of Staff here recently reviewed Far East strategy. Their Views are briefly as follows:-

Security of our Imperial interests in Far East lies ultimately in our ability to control sea communications in South Western Pacific for which purpose adequate fleet must be based on Singapore.

Previcus policy regarding despatch of Fleet has been radically altered by French defeat and Naval dispositions are now dependent on retaining in European waters sufficient naval forces to match both German and Italian fleets. In present circumstances therefore we cannot send a fleet to the Far East.

3.

Meantime strategic importance to us of Far East both for Empire security and to enable us to defeat enemy by control of essential commodities at source has increased.

4.

Japanese advance in China and Hainan has increased threat to Malaya and any further advance into French Indo- China, Dutch possessions or Thailand would endanger still more our position at Singapore which is the key point in Far Easto Owing to increased range of aircraft and development of aerodromes, particularly in Thailand, we can no longer concentrate on defence of Singapore Island alone but must consider defence of Malaya as a whole, particularly security of up-country landing grounds. For this reason and because we cannot spare a fleet for the Far East at present, it is all the more important that we should do what we can to improve our land and air defences in Malaya.

5.

Your telegram No. 280 of 12th June offered to make certain reinforcements available for Imperial Service as required. Chiefs of Staff consider that the urgent move of one division and two squadrons aircraft to Malaya is desirable as an added immediate deterrent; and ask particularly whether one of the Militia Divisions, which are fully equipped, could be made available. They consider that employment in Malay would for the time being at any rate be in best interests of Empire as a whole.

6.

If owing to equipment or other difficulties you cannot make a whole division immediately available, Chiefs of Staffs recommend move by brigade groups as they become ready.

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