CAB80-13 — Page 278

Page 278

Page 278

ENCLOSURE.

Copy of a telegram from Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) dated-

No.547 DIPP.

19th June, 1940.

254

I have not hitherto been consulted about the diversion of troops, Dominion or otherwise, which were earmarked for the Near East. Nor in normal circumstances should I have expected to be. But with the prospect of failure of France the problem of our position in Egypt is forced to the fore.

2.

I understand from an appreciation telegraphed from London to the Dominion Premiers and shown to me secret ly by General Wavell that the intention is to hold Egypt. This decision I warmly

welcome but if as I hope it is to be maintained at all costs and to the end, we must face the facts. I do not know the terms on which France may give in. But if they involve the handing over of Tunis, Syria or the French fleet this must affect our ability to hold Egypt.

3.

I speak as a layman: but have always understood that except for our shortness in the air and in air defence, our garrison here should have sufficed in collaboration with France in Tunis and Syria to hold the enemy. But if Tunis goes, Syria goes or the French fleet is a doubtful asset the position becomes

very different.

Other-

4. I therefore put it to His Majesty's Government with great force that should you consider my (grp.undec.) that in the event of French surrender both in France and abroad, we here in Egypt should be at once reinforced with every available aeroplane, battalion and ship that is not vitally required elsewhere. wise, with over 200,000 Italians in Libya and the prospect of German reinforcements there to an unknown extent, including especially aeroplanes sufficient in numbers to bomb Egypt out of existence, our task here becomes very difficult if indeel tenable. But I submit that it should not be impossible if we act in time; adequately garrisoned for all eventualities we should be able to hold Egypt against both internal and external danger, so garrisoned we have in Egypt a Near Eastern base from which to continue the war and to wage it successfully, thus contributing materially to the final victory.

5.

I repeat, to do this if France gives in we need prompt reinforcement of every arm. In addition we want to know that we can and shall in case of need draw upon the whole resources of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, and especially that we shall receive aeroplanes of sufficient number and type to meet a combined Italian-German onslaught amounting may be to thousands of planes.

6.

As I see it the enemy may do one or both of two things, France being out of the picture attack England or go for us here in Egypt. The latter may even come first.

77.

If they go for Egypt we have seemingly two alternatives. To hold on here prepared and equipped we see the thing through to the bitter end as I devoutly hope we shall; or to get out of Egypt whilst there is still time. Latter course has hitherto always seemed to me unthinkable; and would incidentally render inapplic- able our treaty guarantee of protection of Egypt; but in the light of the Egyptian attitude we have no need to be squeamish.

8.

To sum up:

from every point of view political, moral and strategical, I trust there will be no question of our clearing out: but if we are to hold Egypt give us in the event of French default, sufficient force of all arms. undec.) it would be useless waste of British and Egyptian life to

Without adequate resources (grp. cling to position which we cannot hold.

9.

I have not submitted the above to General Wavell or anyone else as I wish your Lordship to be in possession of my own uninfluenced views as Ambassador in Egypt, and Your Lordship may judge it inopportune to circulate it. desirable I will consult him upon it.

But should you deem it

Page 278

Page 278

Page 278