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It would be necessary to put in forces of

approximately one brigade group in each of the two groups of islands in order to hold them against any attempt by the enemy to drive us out. If the only opposition to be expected were that of the Portuguese, highly trained troops would not be required for the purpose. But there are known to be many Germans and Italians in the Islands and it would be a mistake to under-estimate our possible difficulties. We consider that to carry out these operations effectively two well trained brigades ought to be used but they are not at present available.

Canaries.

4.

The capture of Grand Canary, which we should require as a base for surface vessels, would be a formidable undertaking. There are powerful coast defences in the island, which is held by a garrison of the strength almost of one division. This garrison is known to have been recently reinforced, and there are some 1,500 Germans in the island who may be expected to stiffen very considerably the powers of resistance of the Spanish troops.

A preliminary examination of the problem indicates that a specially trained force of at least the strength of one division will be required for the operation. In order to ensure surprise, which is essential to success, it will not be possible to work from advanced base, and the whole expedition would have to sail direct from the United Kingdom. The long sea voyage involved considerably complicates the problem.

Bearing these considerations in mind, it will be clear that there can be no question of undertaking the operation in the immediate future. On the other hand its chances of success would at least be seriously prejudiced if enemy air forces were established in bases on the adjacent mainland, either in Rio D'Oro or Morocco. As long as French resistance in Africa continues, the enemy could bring only a relatively light scale of attack to bear from bases in Spain and, to a limited extent, from Rio D'Oro. If French North Africa falls into enemy hands, however, the enemy could organise bases within close range of the Canaries from which a heavy scale of attack could be maintained. We have given instructions for a more detailed appreciation to be prepared, so that a final decision may be taken as to whether the operation is feasible or not when troops, air forces and equipment are available.

Our present intelligence arrangements in the Canaries leave much to be desired, and we are arranging for these to be improved, and at the same time, for measures to counter probable Fifth Column activities by the Germans and Italians in the islands.

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