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APPENDIX IV.

German Air Operations in France.

It is now possible to distinguish five phases in the German air offensive against France since the 10th May:-

(1) During the first three days the main attack was on aerodromes and landing grounds. Eighty-one separate landing grounds were attacked, and raids on railway communications and factories were on a com- paratively small scale.

(2) During the period of the advance through Belgium and France to the Channel Ports, activities were concentrated primarily on targets directly connected with the operations of the ground forces. Fifty-nine attacks were, however, made on aerodromes, and thirty-seven on factories.

(3) During the evacuation of Dunkirk from the 27th to the 31st May the German Air Force concentrated on impeding the escape of the British and French Northern armies, and raids elsewhere in France were practically abandoned.

(4) From the 1st to the 4th June, there were heavy raids on communications and factories near Paris, in the Lyons district, and at Marseilles and other points in Southern France.

(5) Since the opening of the final offensive, operations have again been concentrated on the support of the ground forces; there have, however, been raids on the remaining Channel ports, the Atlantic ports, and on road and rail communications behind the French armies.

It is not yet possible to form any picture of the effects of these raids on the industrial life of France. There is, however, no doubt that substantial damage was done to communications, in particular to railways and ports. After the initial surprise, the damage to aerodromes and aircraft on the ground was never very great.

German Air Landing Tactics.

Recent experience indicates that German methods of landing from the air in hostile territory are likely to follow somewhat the following pattern. Attacks will probably be preceded by diversion attacks elsewhere, in order to draw off fighter defences; they will take place at dawn and will concentrate on two or three large aerodromes or landing grounds near some suitable port. Enemy fighters will appear first to draw off or beat down fighter opposition. They will be followed by low-flying bombers and fighters attacking the aerodrome defences and the perimeter of the aerodromes. Three or four companies of parachute troops may be dropped at points some distance from the aerodrome. It would be for these troops to complete the initial attack on the aerodrome defences; and if this were successful, it would at once be followed by the arrival of large numbers of troop transports landing on the aerodrome at very short intervals, possibly at the rate of six a minute. From these could be landed troops armed with heavy and light machine-guns, two-inch and three-inch mortars, and possibly three-inch mountain guns and light anti-aircraft guns capable of use as anti-tank weapons. Motor cycles and side-cars might also be landed. At the same time, patrols of fighters in considerable strength would be maintained over each of the aerodomes attacked. The essential point in combating these tactics is to prevent the landing of the troop transport aircraft. The parachutists can act only as shock troops and are not in a position to maintain themselves unless reinforcements and supplies are forthcoming at once, according to plan.

There has been considerable discussion of the possibility of using gliders for air landings, and gliders with a considerable carrying capacity have been evolved. They are, however, very vulnerable to weather conditions and to attack while in the air, and have few advantages over ordinary aircraft, except that they can land in a comparatively small area. It is not probable that they wil be used on a large scale where an adequate supply of troop-carrying machines is available.

THOUSANDS OF TONS.

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