CAB80-13 — Page 189

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173

(76)

Naval.

Air.

Escort cover for the convoys

depcnding on the naval situation at the time. An aircraft

carrier to provide and maintain air protection until adequate

A. A. defences have been established ashore. One or two cruisers

and at least two destroyers to

cover the landings.

One fighter squadron.

Shipping. At least six liners and M.T. and

store ships as necessary,

A.L.Cs. for the assault battalion. M.L.Cs. for landing guns and M.T.

After their capture, as a permament garrison

for the defence of the Canaries:

1 Infantry brigade group.

1 heavy A.A. regiment,

1 light A.A. regiment. R.D.F. Station.

A/S defences.

1 Bomber squadron.

1 fighter squadron,

also, possibly, Coast Defence Equipment.

We

These forces exceed the former estimate. have considered whether they could be reduced if La Luz is only required for occasional use, but have come to the conclusion that nothing less than the scale of defence recommended would be of real value,

3.

It is to be noted that, in any event, it would not be possible to launch an actual assault on the Canaries for about 3 weeks from time the order is given. This moreover is dependent upon a division being mobilised and ready to leave its home station and upon the necessary shipping being held ready in home ports, factors which themselves might impose a further delay of 14 days.

4.

In our previous paper we stated that, with France out of the war and Spain against us, "the Canaries would be of importance to us as providing the nearest bases to the Straits of Gibraltar that we could hope to hold". Use of La Luz harbour 640 miles from Gibraltar would simplify the maintenance of naval forces at sea to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar but these forces could not be sure of intercepting enemy naval units leaving the Mediterranean, particularly if strong enemy air forces were established in Spain or North Africa, It therefore appears that our strategy must take account of the fact that egress from the Mediterranean, though it may be hampered by submarines, or by a force sent there for a short period, cannot be prevented with any certainty. these conditions, the possession of a base in the Canaries is not a requirement of the highest importance.

Under

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