CAB80-13 — Page 156

>

Page 156

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

MOST SECRET

0.0.S.(40)

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

COPY NO.

17th June 1940.

WAR CABINE T.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMITTEE

URGENT MEASURES TO IEET ATTACK.

Draft Report.

We recently reported upon the means whereby we could continue to fight single-handed if French resistance were to collapse completely. In that paper we stated that there were three ways in which Germany might break down the resistance of the United Kingdom aimed at breaking public morale; by attack on shipping and ports; invasion.

2.

K

unrestricted air attack st rvation of the country and occupation by

Now that organised French resistance is at an end, we are confronted with the very situation envisaged in that report.

3.

We cannot say for certain that Germany will attempt invasion. She is free to do so if she chooses and, if successful, the result would be final. Moreover, invasion offers her by far the quickest method of achieving a decision, and would succeed or fail before American assistance gould take effect.

Experience of the campaign in Flanders and France indicates that we can expect no period of respite before the Germans may begin a new phase of the war, We must, therefore, regard the threat of invasion as immediate.

4.

From the military point of view we feel that we can have confidence in our ability to resist all forms of attack, only when the most drastic and far-reaching measures which we have already recommended in W.P.(40)168, are completed. We are seriously concerned with the fact that certain of the measures recommended in paragraph 23 of that report have not yet been carried out, on the necessary scale, although they have been approved by the Government. In particular we have in minä”(iii). (vi) (xi), (xiii) and (xiv).

5.

The Germans have accepted prodigious losses in France, and are likely to be prepared to face even higher losses and to take even greater risks than they took in Norway to achieve decisive resuis against this country.

*W.P.(40) 168.

1

Fond

Page 156

Page 156

Page 156