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western districts the Dutch predominate. Every man between the ages of 18 and 56 is enrolled to serve in the Burgher force. They elect a Commandant and one or two Sub-commandants. When called out, the Commandant takes charge of them. Field-cornets, who are civil officers like magistrates, are the medium through whom the Burghers are called out. The Burghers do not drill, and are supposed to arm them- selves, but when called out in the late Basuto war, the Colony armed most of them (5183–5193, 5197, 5198). A number of Burghers were sent to serve in the Basuto war,

but it was in some cases difficult to get them to go. Some paid large sums for substitutes. Many from the western district were discontented, and deserted, more especially after the outbreak in the Transvaal, chiefly from dislike of leaving their homes (5204). As an inducement to go, they had been informed that they would not be wanted for more than three months, so when the three months expired they went away. Some were fined in accordance with the Colonial Burgher Act, but a great number of the desertions were passed over, because the men had been kept in the field longer than was promised (5205– 5211). There were no desertions among the enrolled volunteers (5212).

Levies.-There are about 4,000 native levies in the peninsula, chiefly Hottentots and Malays. The officers of the levies are appointed by the Governor instead of being elected as the Burgher officers are. levies are neither drilled nor armed (5196-5203).

The

Colonel Sir JOHN STOKES, K.C.B., R.E.

Conditions and Trade of the Suez Canal-By the terms of the Suez Canal Company's Charter, every nation has an equal right to send ships through on payment of the dues. There is no limitation as to the passage of ships of war, or the conveyance of troops or warlike stores. Overtures were made at one time with a view to secure neutrality, but no Treaties have been negotiated (5229-5231).

The total gross tonnage passing through the Canal increased from 1,439,169 in 1872, to 4,344,519 in 1880. British tonnage increased in the same time from 1,059,926 to 3,446,431. Foreign tonnage rose from 379,243 in 1872, to 585,281 in 1873, and in 1880 only reached 898,088, proving that the great increase which has taken place since 1872 is really due to an increase of British tonnage (5232).

Ships drawing 24 feet of water can pass.

On one occasion a ship of over 25 feet went through. There is a rocky sill at 26 feet, which fixes the limit. The Indian troop-ships of 4,000 tons are among the largest English ships that have gone through (5233- 5235). Every part of the Canal wants dredging once in five years on an average, and some parts more frequently. At Port Saïd it is dredged every year (5236).

Military Importance of the Canal. The importance to this country of the Canal as the road to India can hardly be overrated (5237), and it would be of equal importance to France, in the event of war, to get hold of it as a means of striking a blow at our com- merce and communications with India. She could get in a fortnight from Port Said to India, while it would take us six weeks at least to get there round the Cape. If we went to war with France, their first step would be to seize Egypt. Neutralization would be of no avail, as no Treaties hold good in time of war. We ought to be prepared for a race for the possession of Egypt, and to have men and material ready to enable us to take Alexandria and Port Saïd immediately on the outbreak of war (5238-5242). If the race were to be from English ports against the French, we should be beaten. Our only chance would be by starting from Malta. We ought to have ready at Malta guns of position and munitions of all kinds ready to throw into Egypt. We must also have a strong force to guard them there, otherwise we should only be making a present of them to the enemy and for this purpose we must have command

of the sea.

We should need such a fleet as could confront any fleet which we might expect to meet. To insure the protection of merchant-vessels would need a greatly superior force (5260–5267).

If we held the Canal we could keep it open, as we should hold it by a military force, and should natu- rally not allow the preparations to be made which would be necessary for blowing in the banks. Moreover, any such obstruction could be dredged away in a few hours with the means available on the spot. If a ship were sunk in a sandy or alluvial spot, a passage could be dredged round her in a week; on the rocky sill it would be necessary to blow her up which would take longer. A rigid inspection and regulations would afford security against any such danger (5243, 5244).

Defence of the Canal.-To defend the Canal we must, in the first place, have command of the sea. We must station a fleet at Port Saïd, and always keep guard-ships there. Being unable to fortify the posi- tions permanently in preparation for war, any land defences which we should be able to construct would be of such a character that the heavy guns of ships would soon batter them down (5245-5247). The Admiralty have a small plot of land at Suez, but it is useless as a point from which to hold the Canal (5268); it is insufficient in size, and could not be for- tified beforehand. Secondly, we must have a body of not less than 20,000 British troops in Egypt. The French could send a force into Egypt from Tripoli, though the march is exceedingly difficult; "we must therefore be prepared to hold the country against a French invasion by land. Thirdly, we must have the alliance of Egypt herself (5248–5250, 5252).

On the east side of the Canal there is a strong posi tion, in which we might successfully oppose a force approaching from the north. Such a force would be necessarily limited, owing to the difficulty of pro- curing food and water. The Turks, if in alliance with France, might advance against us through Syria, in which case we should require a larger force than 25,000 men. Russia would be the most probable ally of France, and in that case the Turks would not be likely to be on the same side (5251-5258).

On the western side the defence would be the oc cupation of Alexandria and Cairo. Nothing less would be of any avail. If the French got possession of Cairo and Alexandria we should be unable to hold the Canal (5259).

French Influence in Egypt.-In theory, there is in every branch of the Egyptian Administration an Englishman and a Frenchman, occupying equal posi- tions, but the preponderance of Frenchmen in in- ferior positions is very remarkable, and they are by this means acquiring a great hold over the Ad- ministration (5269, 5270). The Egyptian Govern- ment are much afraid of a French occupation be- coming permanent. We have great difficulty as it is in holding our own, because the French are always trying to get in, and are more active than we are (5276, 5277). The control of the Canal is almost en- tirely in French hands, and it is difficult, with the existing system, to get Englishmen employed. In case of war, we should have to turn out the French staff and put in English people. In 1874, when Lesseps refused to accept the Sultan's award, we were pre- pared to suspend the French officials and work the Canal through English and Egyptian officers (5271, 5272). Any trained engineers could take up the engineering work. Pilots would perhaps be the most difficult to get; but the present pilots are mostly Greeks, and probably means could be found to secure them (5275).

If the French were in possession of the Canal they might pass ships througli of a sufficient size to be a serious danger to our trade in the Indian Ocean, a danger which we could only meet by keeping a fleet at Suez, where there is a fair anchorage (5278-5284). This points to the great importance of Aden, which we must hold strongly with ships and men (5285).

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