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Previously to this, the Dutch would have heartily co-operated in defence against anything outside the Colony, but since the difficulties began in the Trans- vaal there has been an astounding increase of the anti-English and pro-Dutch feeling (5019-5020). This feeling will have to be taken into calculation in con- sidering the defence of the Peninsula, and unless it improves will render necessary the construction of closed works individually defensible by small garrisons of regular troops (5021-5028). In a war with a great naval Power, it would be difficult to prevent the colonists from declaring their neutrality, which would virtually amount to declaring their independence, and would mean considerable advantage to the attacking Power. If a hostile squadron were to appear, the English garrison would be in a precarious position, unless the works were each, like a small citadel, capable of defence (5071-5078).

Local Levies.-The Dutch and English are now so intimately mixed, that it would be impossible to adopt any principle of separation in the composition of local levies. It would be dangerous to try to form volunteer corps which should be substantially English. There will always be a certain proportion of the Dutch who are as loyal as Englishmen, and any soreness that they may feel would be aggravated if distinction of nationality were made (5044, 5045). In the present circumstances the garrison must con- sist of regular troops. Local assistance from Port Elizabeth and other places where the English feeling is strong could not be relied upon; but it might be possible to make use of native forces raised either in India or in Africa (5024–5028).

African Levies.-The employment of natives of Africa would be an expedient to be resorted to only in the last extremity (5029). Native levies have been employed in every Cape war for the last fifty years, but since the mutiny of the Kat River Hottentots there has always been a jealousy of embodying them permanently. There is the greatest prejudice against anything like a permanent African force. This pre- judice could only be overcome by a great deal of tact and management, but it would surely give way in the end, as shown by the attitude of the colonists towards the Kroomen from Her Majesty's ships who were lately attached to the naval guns (5090, 5092). The natives who might be enrolled for military service are quite equal to the average Indian Sepoy physically. They are less civilized, and require a great deal of know- ledge to handle them effectively; but they ought to make admirable Sepoys. There is no limit to their fidelity if they are taken in the right way. When well led by officers in whom they have confidence, they are almost irresistible at an attack, and they are good at defence too; but they are more capable of being cowed by defeat and rendered inactive than the races which furnish Sepoys to our Indian army (5117-5121).

Indian Troops.--In default of English troops, a re inforcement of, say, Madras troops would be a possible and a useful expedient, preferable to putting great pressure upon the Colony. These troops are used to crossing the sea, and are of the same races as the coolies whose employment is popular in Natal. They are good working soldiers, and when properly haudled fight and work well, and give little trouble. The experiment, if it is ever made, would require much tact and careful management, and would depend for success very much on the person employed to com- mand (5030-5033, 5091). A beginning might be made with a marine Sepoy force, such as has always existed in India in the service of the Bombay Govern- ment (5092).

Malay Levies.-There is at the Cape a large population of natives of Java and the Eastern Islands, known locally as Malays. They are active and industrious, and there is less race antagonism between them and the Dutch than there is between the Dutch and the natives of South Africa (5030). It would be possible te raise a Malay force, but looking to the effect on the minds of the Dutch people, it would be preferable

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to introduce entire foreigners like Indian troops. The Dutch dislike the idea of these people, who in the memory of men now living were slaves, being volunteers (5034, 5035).

Colonial Levies.-If the present unfortunate state of feeling should pass away and matters should revert to the condition in which they were two or three years ago, a trustworthy auxiliary force formed of Dutch and English could be raised in Cape Town. The disposition to volunteer and to serve, even at great personal cost and inconvenience, was always ex- cellent (5036). In such a case the proportion of 1,000 English regular troops to 3,000 auxiliaries would be quite safe. The existing organization is good. The volunteers, who are in the proportion of three or four English to one of local birth, and are chiefly men comected with the dockyard and railway, turn out and practice with the field guns very well indeed. They are armed with Snider rifles, and have latterly made great progress (5095-5097). The "Duke of Edin- burgh's Own volunteer regiment of rifles is one of the oldest volunteer regiments in the Empire, and has done good service in the last two wars.

There is a body of yeomanry cavalry numbering 80 or 100, mostly Englishmen, which would be capable of increase if it were needed (5037-5040),

The English preponderate in the artillery, engineers, and probably in the infantry. There would be a feeling against registering any of them as of one nationality or the other (5043).

In 1877 volunteering had become rather unpopular, and was only kept up by the traditions of ten or twelve years before, by the personal influence of a few public-spirited men, and by the exertions of indi- vidual officers. After the change of Ministry in 1878 four measures were passed, calculated to improve the volunteers, the burghers, and the police, and with a very little help in the shape of competent drill in- structors and officers, the forces might have been so organized as to supply the 3,000 men required for the Peninsula. The Cape Government are well-inclined to take a fair share of the defence, and if the popular temper returns to the state in which it was a year or so ago, and if Her Majesty's Government would give assistance in officers and drill-instructors, there would be no difficulty in getting three-fourths of the neces- sary garrison-3,000 or more efficient men of all arms -within twelve miles of Cape Town. The employ- ment of regular officers with colonial forces should be encouraged, and colonial service with volunteers should be considered by the military authorities in the same light as service in India or elsewhere abroad. Such aid would be invaluable to the Colony, and would be useful to the Imperial Government by pro- viding active military duty for a large body of officers in time of peace. The obstacles to this being done did not originate with the Horse Guards, but existed in the form of Rules, invented to save expense to the Imperial Exchequer, and applied in a narrow spirit (5041, 5079-5089).

The colonial forces have turned out in the last two wars in numbers estimated at from 12,000 to 18,000 men, for six months at a time, to serve at a distance of 700 or 800 miles from their homes (5042, 5098). The burghers are the old local force, and are liable to be called out only by the authority of the Crown. To some extent that authority has been impaired by the decision of Her Majesty's present Government with regard to the proposed action against the Pondos and Basutos, that the colonists must do their own fighting. It was supposed to be a mere matter of police, but it proved to be a matter requiring the presence of a considerable military force. The operations in Basutoland and Kaffraria were conducted by the Colonial Government as if they were independent. To that extent an important principle has been weakened, though not abandoned, in terms that would prevent its being assumed again. The right to call out and direct in the field all forces, whether colonial or otherwise, rests with the Representative of the Crown, and the law and the conditions stand as they

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